



**UNODC**

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime



Guidance on the preparation and use of  
**serious and organized  
crime threat assessments**

The SOCTA Handbook



UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME  
Vienna

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UNITED NATIONS  
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## Foreword

This Handbook provides guidance to make organized crime threat assessments. It helps practitioners identify the risk factors, crime types, perpetrators and their collaborators. The methodology is designed to generate the information and analysis needed for intelligence-led policing and evidence-based policy.

Such assessments are badly needed. In the United Nations system, there are more than 100,000 “blue helmets” (peacekeepers), and more than 10,000 blue berets (police). But there are only a handful of practitioners with expertise in dealing with organized crime. This is a major handicap since organized crime—like the trafficking of drugs, weapons, natural resources or people—is an impediment to almost every United Nations peacekeeping and peace-building operation, from Haiti to Timor Leste, from Afghanistan to the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Many national governments are also unprepared or ill-equipped to deal with organized crime. By using this Handbook, they will create the intelligence needed to diagnose the severity of the situation, target the necessary resources to the right areas, and take remedial action to stop it. Furthermore, the very process of preparing such assessments can strengthen inter-agency cooperation and raise organized crime up the political agenda.

My thanks to the experts who have compiled this Handbook. I urge you to apply its good practices in order to prevent and control organized crime.



Antonio Maria Costa  
Executive Director  
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime  
Vienna—August 2009



## Foreword

Every day, police chiefs throughout the world are required to make critical decisions that directly impact upon the safety and security of the citizens they have sworn to serve and protect. More often than not, the resources that police have at their disposal to pursue their essential mission are outweighed by the very real dangers posed by serious transnational crime and terrorism.

Having a clear set of priorities and allocating resources soundly is key to effective policing, especially in an increasingly globalized world. As the introduction of this Handbook points out, most forms of serious crime nowadays have a global reach and are increasingly complex, which in turn leads to ever-advancing intelligence needs on the part of police.

As the Secretary General of a global police organization comprising 187 member countries, I have come to understand not only the vital importance of producing professional threat assessments to drive effective actions and deliver sustainable contributions to security, but also the difficulty in undertaking such assessments.

The SOCTA Handbook is an excellent initiative, and will become an essential resource for senior decision makers, managers, analysts and police chiefs worldwide.

I am very pleased, on behalf of INTERPOL, to thank the authors and experts for their contributions to this handbook and will recommend it to police forces across the globe.



Ronald K. Noble  
INTERPOL Secretary General





## Preface

This Handbook by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) on how to use and prepare serious and organized crime threat assessments was made possible thanks to the active support and contributions of dedicated professionals of Member States of the United Nations, of international and non-governmental organizations and academic institutions, including:

Mohammed Arshad, Transnational Crime Adviser, Standing Police Capacity Police Division, Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the United Nations;

Janine Enniss, Liaison Officer, Border and International, Australian Federal Police;

Robert C. Fahlman, Director General, Criminal Intelligence, Royal Canadian Mounted Police;

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# INTRODUCTION

## A. Objectives of this Handbook

The principal objective of this Handbook is to assist policymakers and managers to make better decisions about the response to serious and organized crime by providing a model and guidance for undertaking a national serious and organized crime threat assessment. The Handbook also seeks to assist government policymakers, law enforcement leaders and managers, and practitioners:

- To recognize the benefits of undertaking national serious and organized crime threat assessments;
- To appreciate the importance and value of establishing an ongoing system for commissioning, reviewing and acting upon regular serious and organized crime threat assessments—particularly to enable them to develop and deliver more effective strategies to tackle serious and organized crime (both nationally and locally);
- To understand the key stages of constructing and developing a national serious and organized crime threat assessment; and,
- To identify the key elements of a training programme to be used to support the development of a national serious and organized crime threat assessment.

## B. How to use this Handbook

This Handbook is designed to be of assistance to policymakers in government, to leaders and managers in law enforcement agencies and other agencies both in the public and private sector whose activities are affected by serious and organized crime, and by practitioners responsible for developing serious and organized crime threat assessments.

Part one of the Handbook is directed principally at policymakers, leaders and managers and seeks to explain what a serious and organized crime threat assessment is, the

rationale for undertaking a national level serious and organized crime threat assessment and the implications of doing so. It also touches upon the resources and skills required.

Part two of the Handbook is aimed primarily at those charged with undertaking a national serious and organized crime threat assessment and outlines a recommended methodology to be adopted from the start point of identifying the task and agreeing the terms of reference, through the various stages of developing the assessment to the production of the document and its dissemination.

Part three outlines a suggested training package to assist with the undertaking of a national serious and organized crime threat assessment. The Handbook also has a number of annexes to assist readers.

A short training programme before starting is regarded as essential for reaching a common understanding on both terminology and expectations from all involved in the process as well as for team building.

## C. Glossary of terms

It will become apparent when working through this Handbook that certain terms frequently appear and some of them are noted below. It should be recognized that the meanings attributed to these terms should not be taken as the only meaning as national legislation, context and culture may well provide alternative meanings. They are given for guidance only.

<b>Term</b>	<b>Meaning</b>
<i>Analysis</i>	Analysis is the process of collecting, reviewing and interpreting a range of data and making inferences and recommendations.
<i>Analytical techniques</i>	Methods with which to examine information for a given purpose.
<i>Intelligence</i>	Information that has been assessed for a given purpose.
<i>Intelligence cycle</i>	A model detailing the phases that drive analytical output including: <i>Planning and tasking</i> —sets the objectives and scope of the task; <i>Collection</i> —gathers information relevant to the task; <i>Processing</i> —organizes material in a logical, useable form; <i>Analysis</i> —evaluates and analyses information to develop inferences, identify intelligence gaps and provide recommendations; <i>Dissemination</i> —effectively communicates the outcomes of analysis based on the initial task.

<i>Intelligence-led policing</i>	A business model where data analysis and crime intelligence are central to an objective, decision making process that facilitates crime and problem reduction, disruption and prevention. <sup>1</sup>
<i>Key findings</i>	Critical issues identified and highlighted for action.
<i>Law enforcement</i>	All agencies with a remit to enforce any part of the law including the police, customs, immigration, border control, financial regulators and anti-corruption bodies.
<i>Organized criminal group</i>	A structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences as defined in the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.
<i>Policymaker</i>	Government Ministers, politicians, officials in government departments and leaders of organizations who have a responsibility for setting strategy and direction, the creation of objectives and the allocation of resources.
<i>Private sector</i>	Persons and organizations not using government funding, usually retaining any income for private use.
<i>Public sector</i>	Persons and organizations working on behalf of the community, usually funded by government.
<i>Recommendation</i>	Suggested course of action to address previously identified issues.
<i>Serious crime</i>	Conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty.
<i>Situation report</i>	A product describing the current state of affairs.
<i>Terms of reference (ToR)</i>	Terms of reference should capture the tasking and define the scope and research methods for a piece of analysis.
<i>Threat</i>	Some person or group of people with the intention and capability to cause harm to the state and society.
<i>Threat assessment</i>	A product that through an agreed methodology provides analysis and guidance for action on tackling the issues identified that may cause harm to the state and society in the future.

<sup>1</sup> There are many different explanations of “intelligence-led policing”. This one is based upon the one expounded in “*Intelligence-Led Policing*” by Jerry Ratcliffe (2008), page 89.





# PART ONE

## What is a serious and organized crime threat assessment (SOCTA) and why is it an important organizational policymaking and management tool?

### A. Why is there a need for a SOCTA?

1. Serious and organized crime is a significant challenge for all governments. It is not only a challenge in its own right by undermining personal and state security, but has the potential to impact upon other critical areas of human security, be they social, political, economic or environmental.<sup>2</sup> It threatens safety, stability and development—at the level of individual, in local communities and nationally (and, of course, transnationally.)
2. Many aspects of serious and organized crime have a global reach—for example, drug and people trafficking, fraud and money-laundering. But their activities also have a major impact on individual countries and in local communities, where the victims and perpetrators originate and where the “goods” are made, transit, taken, sold or used.
3. The complexity of serious and organized crime is also increasing and changing with new opportunities for criminals constantly evolving, often assisted by developments in society (such as globalization and advances in technology).<sup>3</sup> New routes are being used and new methods of operation are regularly identified and implemented. Criminal activity is more flexible and more dynamic than before—change is a constant activity for serious and organized criminals. And understanding how serious and organized crime operates is made more difficult by the covert nature of most of its activities—the criminals do not want to be caught!
4. But understanding the scale and impact of serious and organized crime (how criminals are operating and the effect of their activities on communities and government), and identifying and implementing effective strategies to minimize their criminal activities, is absolutely essential for there to be a national response. This is a major challenge for all countries. In some countries there may be a shortage of information; more frequently there is too much information but it is disorganized or inaccessible,

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<sup>2</sup>Trends in Crime and Justice, 2005 (UNODC/UNICRI)—“The evolving challenge of transnational organized crime”, pp. 25 to 54.

<sup>3</sup>Op. cit., p. 27

or not “joined up”, with individuals, departments or agencies unwittingly failing to share it with others (“do we know what we know, and what we don’t know?”). In most countries there are usually several agencies with responsibility for preventing and investigating various aspects of serious and organized crime; arranging these activities to avoid duplication and ensure maximum coordination, impact and value for money can be a challenge.

5. The implementation of a national threat assessment process and the production of a national serious and organized crime threat assessment (a “SOCTA”) will provide a better and broader understanding of the challenges posed and the modus operandi being used by criminals at a stated period of time. It is essential to understand the overall picture of the threats and harms posed by serious and organized crime, their impact (internationally, nationally and locally) and how they are changing and developing. Equally importantly, it will improve the response to serious and organized crime by helping to identify priority issues for action. It will also enable more effective and coordinated strategies to be developed and implemented to better prevent and investigate serious and organized crime. It will allow the government and law enforcement agencies to get on to the front foot in tackling serious and organized crime, with a greater opportunity to make communities safer and increase public confidence.


6. The development of serious and organized crime threat assessments is, therefore, beneficial for a number of related reasons as they:

- Enable the government to more effectively protect the state and its people from the effects of serious and organized crime;
- Institutionalize procedures in which information on serious and organized crime can be more systematically collected, assessed and published;
- Are a crucial government and organizational policymaking and management tool to identify priorities and guide decisions as to the allocation of resources;
- Will identify effective actions in terms of better prevention, intervention and partnerships;
- Are excellent monitoring tools when produced regularly;
- Provide a foundation on which other information and intelligence tools (for example the requirements for future criminal intelligence collection) can be built; and,
- Make an important contribution to a higher degree of transparency and provide a forum to involve relevant stakeholders (such as, for example, business groups and community leaders) in debates as to how serious and organized crime can be effectively countered;
- Provide a mechanism for promoting collaboration and cooperation across a range of public and private sector organization stakeholders.

In short, implementing a national SOCTA process improves knowledge, assists decision making, improves the use of limited resources and drives action.

## B. What is a national SOCTA?

Figure 1. The SOCTA pyramid



7. Conducting a national serious and organized crime threat assessment is a process to help decision making. It will describe and assess the threats posed to a country now and in the future from the whole range of serious and organized crime activity, identify gaps in knowledge and the intelligence requirements to fill those gaps, and make recommendations about the threats identified.<sup>4</sup>

8. So a serious and organized crime threat assessment establishes a better understanding of the picture of serious and organized crime in a country and how it may develop in the future. This includes understanding the impact within the country of serious and organized crime activity occurring or initiating outside the country. It covers the whole range of serious and organized crime activity, not just a particular commodity.<sup>5</sup> It is about various criminal markets and sectors—the activities of serious and organized crime—and about the membership and structure of criminal groups involved in such activities. It is about using and interpreting both quantitative and qualitative data to describe serious and organized crime activities, and to assess their threat to the country, the extent of the risk they pose and the level of harm they cause both now and potentially in the future. This is the “big picture” and is forward looking. It will, of course, draw upon information identified in operational reports but will not usually go into the detail of individual suspects (a SOCTA is usually described as a “strategic” product, rather than a “tactical” product).

9. A serious and organized crime threat assessment is more than a situation report. A situation report is the drawing together of various data without the subsequent analysis

<sup>4</sup>Different examples of SOCTAs OCTAs and other law enforcement reporting can be found by visiting the following websites. [www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=publications&language={Europol}](http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=publications&language={Europol}) [www.soca.gov.uk/assessPublications/UKTA0809.html](http://www.soca.gov.uk/assessPublications/UKTA0809.html) {Serious Organized Crime Agency, UK} [www.page2007.com/dni\\_2008.pdf](http://www.page2007.com/dni_2008.pdf) {Central Intelligence Agency, USA} [www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/es-ae/2007/enviro-scan-analyse-2007-eng.pdf](http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/es-ae/2007/enviro-scan-analyse-2007-eng.pdf) {Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Canada}.

<sup>5</sup>It should be noted that although the intention is to have one national assessment of the total organized crime environment this process can be used to address particular organized crime issues including markets, sectors and groups. These assessments could still support the production of the national SOCTA.

and interpretation. It will provide an overview of what has happened but does not include the forward look. A situation report is helpful but not as valuable to policy-makers and managers as a serious and organized crime threat assessment.

10. This Handbook is focusing upon the development of a SOCTA at national level. In many countries such threat assessments are also developed regionally and/or locally (perhaps focusing upon a city, region or other defined geographical area), by individual agencies for internal use and on a “commodity” basis (for example examining the impact of drugs trafficking or corruption in a country). These more specific assessments are extremely valuable when putting together the bigger picture in a national serious and organized crime threat assessment.

### C. Key elements to consider when commissioning a SOCTA

11. Of prime importance when commissioning a SOCTA is to decide who is actually going to produce the document. There are a variety of options. In some countries there may be a specific agency with such a responsibility (for the collection and analysis of criminal intelligence), or an existing agency which can be identified and tasked to undertake this work because of its role in preventing or investigating serious and organized crime. It has been suggested that an “external” agency, apart from traditional law enforcement may be well placed to undertake this work, such as an independent “watch-dog” authority or an academic institution. Ultimately, this is a matter for national choice.

12. There are some other key elements that have to be considered when a SOCTA is being commissioned. One of those is the resources that will be required. Ideally there will be a small team including a supervisor and two or three analysts or researchers. This team should have easy access to—and work in close cooperation with—operational law enforcement officers. Preferably the team members will be trained criminal analysts—but if not they need to be individuals who are objective, with creative minds, critical thinkers and good writers. It is an excellent idea to have a “champion” for the SOCTA whose crucial role is to promote the SOCTA. A good SOCTA will take time to produce and six months should be set aside to allow for its completion.

13. The physical location of this team should be considered and appropriate office space, with meeting rooms that are regularly available, should be supplied. The type of office equipment including computers, card systems, secure storage, etc. has to be agreed along with a small budget for travel.

14. The need for training, both for managers and analysts should not be overlooked and part three of this handbook lays out a possible training programme that could assist in filling any training gaps. This training highlights how to construct a SOCTA but also why it’s a useful tool and how policymakers, leaders and managers can get the most from a national SOCTA.

## D. Using a SOCTA

15. The principal reason for undertaking a national serious and organized crime threat assessment is to provide valuable, accurate and timely information to policymakers and managers about the nature and scale of the challenges and how they may develop, to help them make better decisions about how to tackle serious and organized crime. This includes making decisions about priorities for action, identifying preventive and investigative opportunities and allocating resources. So a SOCTA is something to be acted upon.

16. The production of the serious and organized crime threat assessment needs to fit in to the business planning cycle adopted by government and law enforcement agencies so that decisions about priorities, activities and resourcing emanating from the SOCTA can be implemented. The implementation of these decisions also needs to be reviewed and monitored.

17. Each country will need to decide who owns the SOCTA process and ensure that there is a clear understanding amongst all the partner organizations. Membership of the commissioning body needs to be as broad and inclusive as possible—many agencies have information about serious and organized crime, and have a role in preventing and investigating it. All partners to the process should be encouraged to remain active participants throughout the production of the SOCTA thereby maintaining meaningful stakeholder involvement.

18. In some countries this is achieved by a high-level, government-led, committee (often chaired by the Prime Minister or Minister of the Interior) which is responsible for bringing together the key players, commissioning and receiving the SOCTA, acting upon it and subsequently reviewing progress. These key players will usually include leaders from all law enforcement agencies, from various government departments, and possibly from private sector bodies such as the financial sector and academia.

19. So, it is suggested that undertaking a national serious and organized crime threat assessment needs a clearly defined and well managed process:

- To commission it (agree the terms of reference and identify the resources needed to undertake the SOCTA);
- To assist with and support its production (to help the collection of data and unblock “blockages”);
- To receive, consider and accept the completed document and, most importantly;
- To act upon the SOCTA (to identify priority activities that should be undertaken to increase the prevention and investigation of serious and organized crime, to allocate resources and to assess progress).

20. This high level government committee is likely to be supported by additional sub-committees, consisting of working level managers from all agencies, to ensure progress with the threat assessment process is maintained. It will also help in the development of a culture which encourages information sharing, and inter-agency and multidisciplinary partnership-approaches to tackling serious and organized crime.

21. In some countries the national serious and organized crime threat assessment is used by government as the initial building block for the identification of objectives and allocation of resources at the national level. Consequently, it is also important that leaders and managers within law enforcement agencies understand the value and importance of a national serious and organized crime threat assessment.

22. Additionally, a national SOCTA is an extremely valuable tool for law enforcement (and other public and private sector organizations) leaders and managers because it informs them about the latest trends, and how they may develop. This assists in defining their selection of priorities and identifies the best means of operating (what works, and what does not work). In some countries this has contributed to the development of what is known as “intelligence-led policing” where the importance and value of timely and accurate criminal information and intelligence is recognized as essential to effectively tackling serious and organized crime.<sup>6</sup> A key element of intelligence-led policing is about improving the understanding of how criminals operate to enable the most effective means of prevention and investigation to be adopted. Thus the importance of threat assessments is central to making these choices.


23. Thought needs to be given to who the document is for. In some countries the document is a public document. Advantages are that it can be widely circulated to encourage public, business and media to understand risks of serious and organized crime and therefore enhance prevention and public safety. A public document will have more people able to contribute to it as it is not likely to contain any secrets. Some countries do a wholly confidential document, just for the senior personnel in law enforcement and the Ministry; others do a confidential version and a public version. Ultimately this is a matter for national choice but an open version for public consumption is highly recommended.

24. The SOCTA should not be viewed as a once only document. The process should be ongoing and the document should be produced on a regular basis—at least every two years—as the environment changes and criminals develop and deploy new tactics.

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<sup>6</sup> Essential because of the covert activity of professional criminals, difficulty in securing evidence and catching the major criminals.

## E. Part one—checklist



1. Does everyone understand the terminology?
2. Do we have the picture of serious and organized crime in our country?
3. Does a SOCTA or its constituent parts already exist?
4. Who is responsible for tackling serious and organized crime?
5. What systems and structures are in place for tackling serious and organized crime, for example a strategic direction committee or tasking and coordination group?
6. Have SOCTAs from other countries or regions been examined?
7. Who is going to commission the SOCTA?
8. Who will undertake the production of the SOCTA?
9. What resources are required to produce the SOCTA?
10. How will it be used after production?
11. How will the value of the SOCTA be measured, in terms of actionable outcomes?





# PART TWO


## How to prepare a SOCTA

### A. Preparing a SOCTA

25. Part two is intended to equip the individual(s) tasked with completing a national SOCTA with a methodology and step-by-step practical guidance to enable them to create a useful product. The methodology has to be flexible enough to cope with the many different needs of each user of the handbook yet rigid enough to provide a structured, homogeneous approach. It should be noted that although this Handbook will supply the background and some detail for undertaking a national SOCTA it should be accompanied by a training programme ensuring requisite skills are developed.

26. The methodology promulgated within this Handbook is a synthesis and simplification of several broadly similar methodologies used within law enforcement woven into the “intelligence cycle”.

**Figure 2. The intelligence cycle<sup>7</sup>**




<sup>7</sup>[www.armedforces-int.com/images/companies/667/infoterra1.jpg](http://www.armedforces-int.com/images/companies/667/infoterra1.jpg)

The traditional intelligence cycle has five main stages which are used as the basis for the step-by-step approach in this Handbook for constructing a SOCTA.

Subsequent sections within part two of this handbook will explain each stage of the intelligence cycle and take the practitioner through the methodology to be applied to achieve the successful completion of the SOCTA. Planning and tasking is contained within steps 1 to 3, with Collection covered in step 4. Step 5 examines Processing with Analysis and Production encompassed by steps 6 to 9. Dissemination is dealt with in steps 10 and 11.

27. The model shown below which has been distilled from various similar approaches is designed to allow each user of the Handbook the flexibility to utilize different elements of the model dependent upon the resources available for completion of the SOCTA.

**Figure 3. The SOCTA pyramid**



As highlighted in part one there are many advantages in producing a SOCTA. It is not, however, easily achieved and requires the compiler to follow a process that puts the relevant data in a national context. From this understanding a situation report can be compiled and further analysis with the application of appropriate analytical approaches will lead to the final SOCTA.

## **B. Planning and tasking**

28. The decision to commission a SOCTA has been taken at a national level and ideally those who will be involved in the actual production of the SOCTA will have been party to these discussions. The duty of producing it has been passed on to the most appropriate agencies/organizations etc. and the most appropriate individuals within those agencies. It is at this stage that those required to produce the SOCTA begin the process of defining the task in line with the aims and objectives of the client who requested the SOCTA. The final wording of the tasking should be agreed to in

conjunction with the client and this will include agreement on the terms of reference (ToR) of the SOCTA. The ToR should critically assess the objectives and the environment within which the SOCTA is being produced. For example, what relevant legislation exists, who are or should be the main stakeholders, what are the political priorities and imperatives, what government policy already exists in the area, what management structures and organizations are involved, what are the community expectations? Consideration of all these different factors will assist in developing a good ToR.

29. A well defined task leading to a similarly well understood and agreed ToR is a crucial ingredient of a successful SOCTA. The following gives some guidance on a method to help ensure these prerequisites are met.

### **Defining the task, agreeing on the ToR**

This should not be conducted in isolation by one individual. It requires a team effort involving both creative and critical thinking skills. This can be accomplished through brainstorming.

#### ***Step 1—Brainstorming<sup>8</sup>***

30. To assist in task definition one method is to gather a small group of individuals, with diverse backgrounds, to generate ideas on the given topic. As a minimum this group should include the analysts, subject matter experts (SMEs) and appropriate members of the tasking body who commissioned the SOCTA. In this instance the brainstorming group is “to consider the content for a national SOCTA for country X”.

Requirements for an effective brainstorming are:

- A room with a flip-chart or whiteboard etc.
- Approximately 10 people
- Duration of brainstorming usually limited to no more than 30 minutes

Guidelines for a good brainstorming are:

- Encourage all ideas, say whatever comes to mind
- Write down everything
- Quantity rather than quality
- Save criticisms for a later stage
- Keep it fast, furious and short

31. The session involves all participants contributing their thoughts and ideas in order to generate as wide a range of ideas as possible. An example of what a brainstorming on the task of “the content for a national SOCTA for country X” might contain is given below.

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<sup>8</sup> [www.unc.edu/depts/wcweb/handouts/brainstorming.html](http://www.unc.edu/depts/wcweb/handouts/brainstorming.html)

**Step 1—Brainstorming—example**

Heroin	Terrorism	Human trafficking	Arms smuggling
Money laundering	Fraud	Crime groups	Communication
Cybercrime	Violence	Regions	Corruption
Borders	Smuggling	Car theft	Hi-jacking
Kidnap	Drug trafficking	Homicide	Law enforcement
Transportation	Politics	Cooperation	International links
Transit country	Identity fraud	Migration	Synthetic drugs

32. Naturally this list of ideas will be different for every country given their own particular circumstances and environment. The next step in the process is to discuss the points raised and to begin grouping them together in a logical fashion. This is done to bring structure to what has been a deliberately unstructured approach so far. During this phase some ideas may be discarded and others expanded as the discussions evolve. The grouped brainstorming data may look like this:

<i>Crime types</i>	<i>Facilitating factors</i>	<i>Perpetrators</i>	<i>National response</i>
Car theft	Communication	Individuals	Law enforcement agencies
Drug trafficking	Cybercrime	Crime groups (national)	Other agencies (GOs, NGOs, IOs, etc.)
Human trafficking	Corruption	Crime groups (international)	Resources
Homicide	Weak borders	Regional gangs	Cooperation (national)
Smuggling (esp. arms)	Money laundering	Ethnic groups	Cooperation (international)
Kidnap/extortion	Transportation		Legislation
Fraud/tax	Internet		

**Step 2—Defining the task**

33. At this stage an attempt should now be made to draft an initial task definition and terms of reference (ToR). This requires the individual(s) charged with producing the SOCTA to consider the original request from the person or group commissioning the SOCTA in conjunction with the information and opinions generated by the brainstorming session. The ToR should include:

- Who commissioned the report and for what purpose
- The parameters of the report
- The methodology and sources used
- Timescale and any constraints or limiting factors
- An example of a tasking definition, including a brief ToR, is given below.

### *Step 2—Defining the task—example*

34. The objective of this report is to provide a document which details the current and future major threats posed to {insert country} from serious and organized crime.<sup>9</sup> In addition the report intends to give guidance to policy makers on possible courses of action to be taken to reduce the impact of these threats. It will not cover the area of terrorism nor the links between terrorism and serious and organized crime. Furthermore the report does not consider crimes against persons or property unless linked to serious and organized crime.

35. This report was commissioned by {insert client} to allow him / her and his / her office to enact policies, procedures and—where appropriate—suggest changes in legislation to improve the national response to the fight against serious and organized crime.

36. The tasking was delivered to {insert individual/organization} on the 1 January with a deadline of 30 June. The methodological approach taken was to produce a situation report by using information obtained from {insert sources}. Interviews were also conducted with various officials currently involved in the fight against serious and organized crime. Upon creating a situation report more analysis {explain approach} provided the final SOCTA.

### *Step 3—Agreeing on the ToR*

37. Once the initial tasking definition and ToR has been written this should be communicated to the person or group commissioning the SOCTA. Naturally there may be some renegotiation required if the definition and ToR does not cover expectations. Written agreement should be sought to ensure all parties understand all the expectations.

## C. Collection

38. Analysis requires information. One of the key skills in analysis is identifying and retrieving the right kind of information i.e. information that will contribute to assessing the scale and impact of serious and organized crime on society, and this can be loosely termed data collection. In creating a SOCTA it is important to acknowledge that data collection is driven by the recently agreed tasking definition and terms of reference. This provides the framework within which is created a **data collection plan**.

### *Step 4—Data collection plan*

39. In the first instance the data collection plan should be broad, looking to obtain primarily general information across the spectrum of the task and ToR. The type of information and the sources available to provide that information will differ from country to country however some broad source areas can be defined:

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<sup>9</sup>National definition of “serious and organized crime” inserted here.

- Law enforcement and associated agencies
- National and local government information
- Open sources
- Academia
- Private industry
- Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
- International organizations (IOs)
- Subject matter experts

40. Dependent upon the national situation there may be other sources or groups of sources available. This is by no means an exhaustive list and should be viewed as a springboard to generating further possible sources for information. The collection plan should identify the information required and potential sources that could be approached to obtain that information. Great care should be taken when considering how the information should be gathered. For example constructing and distributing a questionnaire may be the best method for retrieving similar types of information from a number of different sources. Perhaps an in-depth interview with a subject matter expert (SME) would be more beneficial in another situation. In other words consider the issues of **quantitative** and **qualitative** data. And remember that some sources will have their own reasons for supplying the information one of which may be to increase their own profile. This is an important reason to gather information from as wide a selection of sources as possible to ward against potential bias.

41. From our earlier example using the brainstorming data, the tasking definition and ToR, part of the collection plan may look like the following;

#### *Step 4—Data collection plan—example*

**Figure 4. Example of a data collection plan**

Collection plan	Sources							
	<i>LEAs</i>	<i>Govt.</i>	<i>Open source</i>	<i>Academia</i>	<i>Private industry</i>	<i>NGOs</i>	<i>IOs</i>	<i>Experts</i>
Human trafficking	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES
Drug trafficking	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
Organized crime groups	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES
Corruption	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	YES
Fraud/tax	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES
Criminal communication	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES
Smuggling of people	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES

Collection plan	Sources							
	<i>LEAs</i>	<i>Govt.</i>	<i>Open source</i>	<i>Academia</i>	<i>Private industry</i>	<i>NGOs</i>	<i>IOs</i>	<i>Experts</i>
Car theft	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES
Immigration legislation	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
Other	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

42. Once the broad source areas have been established then the analyst—or the agreed individual(s) in charge of data collection—should begin the process of obtaining the information. Within each of these areas certain information may be identified as being of particular value. The specific information requirement will then be formulated. For example:

#### Trafficking in human beings

- Q1. How many victims of trafficking (VoT) arrive in the country each year?
- Q2. What are the source and transit countries of VoT?
- Q3. How many rescued VoT give evidence against their traffickers?
- Q4. How is control exercised over the VoT?
- Q5. What are the nationalities/place of origin of the traffickers?
- Q6. Are the traffickers involved in other forms of criminality?
- Q7. How much money is generated from the VoT?
- Q8. Does the money generated from VoT remain in the country?

#### Drug trafficking

- Q1. How many drug addicts are there in the country?
- Q2. What are the main types of drugs being used and abused?
- Q3. What is the mortality rate of drug users?
- Q4. What are the source and transit countries in the trafficking of drugs?
- Q5. What are the nationalities/place of origin of the traffickers?
- Q6. How are the drugs smuggled into the country?
- Q7. How much money is generated from drug trafficking?
- Q8. Does the money generated from drug trafficking remain in the country?

## Organized crime groups

- Q1. How many organized crime groups (OCGs) are active in the country?
- Q2. How many of the OCGs are wholly indigenous?
- Q3. Which OCGs operate wholly independently and which have links to other OCGs?
- Q4. What is the nationality/place of origin of the OCGs leaders?
- Q5. What is the structure of the OCG (loose network, strictly hierarchical)?
- Q6. How international is the scope of the OCG?
- Q7. How does the OCG gain and retain power?<sup>10</sup>

The analyst may be able to get this information directly through personal access to open source data, criminal records, interviewing experts, etc. Otherwise they may have to rely on others being able to access and supply the information on their behalf. In this case more detailed records should be kept in order to keep track of the data collection process.

**Figure 5. Record sheet for the data collection process**

Collection plan	Source tasking							
	Name	Address	Tel No.	E-mail	Agency	Date tasked	Date received	Deadline
Information requirement								
Human trafficking								
Drug trafficking								
Organized crime groups								
Other								

43. It should be recognized that this is a preliminary data collection plan. As the information comes in, is processed and evaluated (stage 3 of the intelligence cycle) and analysed (stage 4 of the intelligence cycle) then further data collection needs will be identified and become hypothesis driven. Thus the data collection plan should be viewed as a living document, adjusted as the process of fulfilling the task of producing a SOCTA is applied.

44. There are many elements to consider in constructing a data collection plan. In particular the breadth, depth and reliability of the sources used will have a major impact upon the quality and usefulness of the information received. Be careful if only one

<sup>10</sup>It is emphasized that these questions are examples—there will be more questions to be answered and they may vary according to the circumstances of the country.



source is being used to supply crucial information that forms the basis of some critical part of the report. Further guidance on the evaluation of information can be found at paragraph 56.

45. Sometimes it is not a lack of information that is the difficulty rather too much information. For example trend analysis requires historical data to be gathered and this may require the data to cover five years or even more. A structured data collection plan can assist in maintaining focus and reducing the amount of non-essential information gathered. It can also act as an easy reference guide when referencing items in the report as well as providing an excellent audit trail.

## D. Processing and evaluation

46. Having begun collecting information there is a requirement to store it in such a way that it can be easily retrieved and analysed. Documents, pictures, video, information in any possible format needs to be quickly retrievable for use. **Information management** is designed to support the handling and arranging of information.

### Step 5—Information management

47. The following definition captures the key elements of information management. Information management describes the means by which an organization efficiently plans, collects, organises, uses, controls, disseminates and disposes of its information, and through which it ensures that the value of that information is identified and exploited to the fullest extent.<sup>11</sup>

48. There are some inherent difficulties when managing information which generally revolve around the issues of standardization and volume. Some data that is received may be “structured” in some fashion. It could be an electronic database of health records containing details on the numbers of people who have died from heroin, cocaine, MDMA abuse, etc. This type of data can be more easily processed and cross-referenced within an information management system than “unstructured” information. This could be a 100 page hard copy document on the harm caused to society by individuals abusing illegal/controlled drugs. Nevertheless the unstructured data—if assessed to be worthwhile to retain—should be recorded and cross-referenced within the information management system. Volume of data, in particular open source information, can pose difficulties regarding its management. This is where the use of a well crafted data collection plan can assist in acting as a first level filter for information gathering.

49. There are many different types of information management systems from hard copy, index card filing methods to sophisticated electronic document management techniques but all have some key components.

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<sup>11</sup>Queensland Information Planning Branch (IPB) Information Standards. Information Standard No. 24 is titled “Policies for the management of information within government”.

*A method for registering information when received*

50. Regardless of the system used each piece of information received should be given a unique reference number (URN) which is logged in some form of register or database. It should then be cross-referenced against the appropriate subject matter which is driven by the methodology being employed to produce the SOCTA.

*A method for storing information*

51. This can be some form of electronic database, or even several databases linked to each other. It can be a filing cabinet/safe in which to store all the hard copy material. Regardless of the form it takes, all the information should be recorded and stored in a secure manner. As the process for developing and producing a national SOCTA evolves it will become apparent that some form of standardized, electronic method of data retrieval and storage would be preferable.

*A method for retrieving relevant information*

52. This is a key element of any information management system. The objective is to ensure that all the relevant information can be retrieved quickly to assist in the analysis and production of the SOCTA. This requires logical cross-referencing capabilities to be developed which should be driven by the methodology employed in the production of the SOCTA. In our example the information should be retrievable against the main categories identified e.g. human trafficking, corruption, legislation, etc. It is quite possible that one document could and should be referenced against several categories.

53. The resources available to create and maintain an information system will dictate the type of system deployed. Even if resources are scarce, time and effort must be dedicated to ensuring proper information management takes place. It will reduce the time spent on data retrieval and increase the quality of information available for analysis at the same time.

*A method for recording the classification<sup>12</sup> and dissemination of information*

54. It is important within a law enforcement environment that all information received is correctly handled in accordance with the relevant, national data protection legislation. This will vary from country to country however any information management system should record the classification of the information received and any dissemination of that information should be recorded and observe the restrictions that the classification or handling codes (see paragraph 55) might impose.

55. A further aspect on the handling of information is the use of **handling codes**. They are additional elements for protecting the source of the information by providing detailed instructions on the use of the information. Handling codes can be used

<sup>12</sup>For example: restricted, confidential, secret, top secret, etc.

independently from the classification of the document and are imposed by the provider of the information. Some commonly used handling codes are: “for police use only; not to be used in court proceedings; not for further dissemination without reference to the provider; not for dissemination outside national law enforcement agencies.” Naturally very restrictive handling codes can make the dissemination of the information problematical for the analyst. Thus, when obtaining information from sources that have placed restrictions upon its use, the data collector should make the provider aware of the difficulties this may cause. It should be highlighted that handling codes can also be used to give permission in order to avoid that restrictions are adopted when they are unnecessary. The use of handling codes in the exchange of intelligence related to law enforcement activity is essential in international cooperation, as rules and procedures, which are common practice in one country, may differ dramatically in another country.

#### *A method for evaluating information*

56. Also contained within the information management system is an **evaluation** of the source supplying the information and the validity of the information itself. Again there are different methods used to evaluate these elements<sup>13</sup> however the most commonly applied and understood is the **4 x 4 (four by four) system**. It should be noted that this system works best when applied to intelligence and care should be taken when using this system to evaluate, for example, open source reporting.

57. Upon receipt of information that is going to be accepted into the information management system it must be evaluated. In the first instance the source of the information is considered and a letter is attached to the source. The conventions applied are as follows:

**Figure 6. Conventions for evaluating the source of information**

	<b>SOURCE</b>
<b>A</b>	Where there is no doubt of the authenticity, trustworthiness and competence of the source, or if the information is supplied by a source who, in the past, has proved to be reliable in all instances.
<b>B</b>	Sources from whom information received has in most instances proved to be reliable.
<b>C</b>	Sources from whom information received has in most instances proved to be unreliable.
<b>X</b>	The reliability of the source cannot be assessed.

After the source has been evaluated the actual **information** itself is evaluated and a number is attached to the information. The conventions applied are as follows:

<sup>13</sup>There are other systems including 5 x 5 x 5 (five by five by five) where the third “5” refers to whom the information can be disseminated. The 6 x 6 (six by six) is used by some military organizations.

**Figure 7. Conventions for evaluating the information**

	<b>INFORMATION</b>
<b>1</b>	This is information where the accuracy is not in doubt.
<b>2</b>	This is information which is known personally to the source but not known personally by the official passing it on.
<b>3</b>	This is information not known personally to the source but corroborated by other information already recorded.
<b>4</b>	This is information which is not known personally to the source and cannot be corroborated.

Some examples:

Information: I saw John Smith take a package handed to him from someone in a BMW car.

Source: Police Officer A. N. Other

Evaluation: A1. The source is reliable (a police officer) and the information was gained from direct observation by the source.

Information: Opium production in Afghanistan reached record levels in 2008.

Source: Turkish Newspaper *Taraf*

Evaluation: X3. It comes from an open source that cannot be easily assessed. The information can be corroborated from other sources.

Information: This criminal gang is using encrypted e-mails to communicate with other gang members. I know because I have seen them sending these e-mails.

Source: Mr. A. Fraud (a usually unreliable source)

Evaluation: C2. Source is unreliable. The information is known personally to the source.

Information: This criminal gang is using encrypted e-mails to communicate with other gang members. I know because I have seen them sending these e-mails.

Source: Mr. A Truth (a usually reliable source)

Evaluation: B2. Source is reliable. The information is known personally to the source.

Information: Fifty six people were prosecuted for trafficking in human beings offences in 2008, an increase of 25 per cent on 2007 figures.

Source: Police National Computer

Evaluation: A1 or B2. The source is a police computer database which some argue is a wholly accurate source (A) while others argue it is a usually accurate source (B). The information given, therefore, can be viewed as accurate without doubt (1) or known personally to the source but not by the official—the computer operator—passing it on (2).

This last example is provided to demonstrate that the evaluation of the source and the information provided is not an exact science. The analyst's judgement will always play a large part when assigning an evaluation to a piece of information.

58. One of the main advantages of going through this evaluation process is the insight it gives the analyst when it comes to reviewing areas where further data collection may be required. There is a general convention that any information evaluated as A1, B1, A2 or B2 does not have to be further corroborated i.e. it is viewed as "true and accurate". All other grades C1 to X4 require additional information to prove or disprove its validity.

59. These then are the key elements that should be considered when implementing an information management system:

- The registering of information for storage and audit purposes;
- The cross referencing of information for retrieval purposes;
- The evaluation of information and source for analysis purposes; and
- The recording of classification and handling codes of information for dissemination purposes.

The data in the tables are used in the information management system. The URN, cross reference and date received are all created by the recipient. If the information has not been evaluated this should also be created. Each piece or segment of information should be separately evaluated. If classification and handling codes have been supplied these should be recorded.

#### Step 5—Information management—example

<i>URN</i>	<i>Classification</i>	<i>Cross reference</i>	<i>Date Recd</i>
01/001	Restricted	Arms smuggling AS01 Corruption CR01 Organized crime OC01 Country X CX01 Country Y CY01 Country Z CZ01	21/01/09

<i>Date of report</i>	<i>Reporting officer and organization</i>	<i>Report ref. no.</i>	<i>Handling code</i>
14/01/09	A N Other Border Police	BP/5234/ANO	LE use only

### Report

On 1 January 2009 at the land border crossing point “Anywhere” between country X and country Y a Volkswagen car registration plate ABC123 was stopped and searched. Found in a concealed space under the rear seat were four AK-47 assault rifles with 10,000 rounds of ammunition. A1

Checks on the car revealed that it is registered to an associate of a known drugs smuggler who is a member of an organized crime group (OCG) that operates from country Z. B2

This OCG is suspected of having corrupt law enforcement officers under their control in country Z. X4

60. The need for efficient and effective information management when conducting an analysis as in-depth as required to complete a SOCTA is of paramount importance. It allows the analyst the confidence to apply their skills to information that they know has been properly managed. How this analysis is conducted is the subject of the next stage of the intelligence cycle and the next section of this Handbook.


## E. Analysis

61. The terms “analysis” and “criminal intelligence analysis” have been defined in many different ways, however most definitions contain words such as information, interpretation and pro-active. Within the remit of this Handbook a suitable definition is criminal intelligence analysis provides information that allows law enforcement authorities to establish a pro-active response to crime.<sup>14</sup>

62. Stage 4 in the intelligence cycle is termed “analysis” and it should be clear from the work done through the previous three stages of planning, collection and processing/evaluating that the groundwork has been set to allow this analysis to take place. In effect some analysis has already been conducted during the process of defining the task, agreeing to the terms of reference and beginning the data collection, processing and evaluation. However, it is during this fourth stage of the intelligence cycle that the application of the analysis methodology is fully implemented.

<sup>14</sup>Aumond 1998: 35-36.

Figure 8. The SOCTA pyramid



The model shown on the left provides a framework within which those tasked with producing a SOCTA can build their own, specific methodology. This will be determined by the resources and skills available for the task.

The subsequent analytical techniques detailed in this section (and others summarized in annex II) will assist in the compilation of a SOCTA. However if the individuals using these techniques are new to criminal intelligence analysis and have no (or little) experience in applying these techniques then further training is essential.

63. The model requires that a situation report is compiled ahead of any attempt to provide a SOCTA. The situation report is a descriptive document which is orientated towards the current serious and organized crime situation. It is a necessary step towards providing the SOCTA which—being a threat assessment—is analytically more ambitious. The situation report provides the platform of current understanding from which various analytical techniques can be applied to assist in the production of the SOCTA. It should answer the so-called **5W1H questions of who, what, when, where, why and how**. It is important to know what you know and to identify intelligence gaps before embarking upon a full, national threat assessment.

#### Step 6—Environmental scanning

64. Having defined the task, begun implementing the data collection plan and started populating the information management system it is now time to begin the analysis of the data. The SOCTA methodology requires that the information being collected is placed in a national, environmental context as law enforcement operates “in the real world”. This requires a regular environmental scan to be completed to identify the key environmental factors that have an impact on law enforcement and its response to serious and organized crime. **Environmental scanning** is a process of gathering, analysing, and dispensing information for tactical or strategic purposes. The environmental scanning process entails obtaining both factual and subjective information on the environment in which law enforcement is operating.

There are three ways of scanning the environment:

**Ad-hoc scanning**—Short term, infrequent examinations usually initiated by a crisis;

**Regular scanning**—Studies done on a regular schedule (say, once a year);

**Continuous scanning**—(also called continuous learning)—continuous structured data collection and processing on a broad range of environmental factors.

65. In today's turbulent environment the best scanning method available is continuous scanning. This allows action to be taken quickly and respond to environmental threats before significant damage is done. This is resource intensive and a more practical option may be to complete an environmental scan as part of the annual or bi-annual SOCTA process. Again each country will have its own key environmental factors but one tool to assist in identifying these is PESTEL analysis.

66. PESTEL is an aide memoire to trigger analysis on certain environmental factors that may have an impact on crime and law enforcement. The individual letters stand for Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental and Legislation. The technique is to consider each of these areas and identify elements within them that may have an impact on law enforcement.

#### Step 6—Environmental scanning—example

**Political factors** to be considered may include:

- The stability of the present government.
- The ideology of the present government.
- Corruption within the political system.
- Relationship with the international community.
- Structure of the political system.

**Economic factors** to be considered may include:

- The amount of regulation within the economy.
- The inflation rate.
- The type of economic system.
- The average earnings of the population.
- The currency exchange rate.

**Social factors** to be considered may include:

- The demographics of the society.
- The extent of social inclusiveness.
- The health of the population.



- Any population shifts.
- The ethnic diversity of the population.

**Technological factors** to be considered may include:

- The use of transportation.
- New communication methods.
- The use of technology in money transfer.
- Technology that may have a dual use.
- Advances in the manufacturing of key technology.

**Environmental factors** to be considered may include:

- Global environmental factors such as availability of water, global warming, etc.
- The use and re-use of resources.
- The impact of the local environment on crime such as housing, security etc.
- The impact of environmental legislation.

**Legislative factors** to be considered may include:

- The strength of legislation in combating serious and organized crime.
- Any loopholes within current legislation.
- The ease with which new legislation can be passed.
- The review process for current legislation.
- International legislation and standards and their impact on national issues.

67. It should be recognized and remembered that this is simply a method to help structure thinking when identifying key environmental factors. They will differ from country to country and as a result it may make more sense to combine some elements, drop others and introduce new ones. Having identified those key factors they should then be woven into the situation report where the analyst deems relevant. Thus a key law enforcement issue may be the trafficking in human beings and a key social issue the demographics and a key economic issue average earnings of the population.

68. Once again the analyst should not attempt this environmental scan in isolation. Another brainstorming session may be required, or certainly discussion with others who can bring a different **perspective** to bear. As every analyst is an individual they each bring their own perspective and **bias** into their analysis. Thus it is important to try and reduce the effect of these by acknowledging their existence and introducing strategies to control them. These strategies include seeking opinions other than the analysts' own, designing and deploying a valid methodology and introducing as much structure and rigour to the analytical process as possible. For example, if the analyst charged with producing the SOCTA has a background in drug trafficking investigations it is possible

there could be a bias towards drug trafficking. Introducing other opinions and a structured approach helps mitigate these inherent difficulties.<sup>15</sup> If possible the original brainstorming group and appropriate subject matter experts (SMEs) should be included.

69. At this stage in the analysis and production of the SOCTA the analyst should be looking to identify the key interdependencies between these broad areas previously identified from the initial brainstorming. For example drug trafficking (broad area) may be increasing due to better communication (interdependency) between national and international organized crime groups (broad area). How the information from the environmental scan impacts upon these interdependencies should then be analysed. For example, new technology (PESTEL) has introduced greater cell phone coverage allowing easier communication between organized crime groups.

70. This will assist in bringing **focus** to the analysis and highlight areas where further data collection may be required. For example close cooperation between two different organized crime groups in country X, one involved in drug supply within country X and the other in people smuggling through country X to country Y, has been identified. The environmental scan has identified weak legislation and lack of resources deployed to tackle illegal migration where country X is only a transit country and not the country of final destination. The analyst will be focusing on gathering further information in these specific areas.


71. This process of gathering information on the broad areas, assessing the national environment and its impact on the broad areas and the interdependencies between these areas continues. Further data collection is undertaken on the critical areas identified and where more information is required, these are termed **intelligence gaps**. Intelligence gaps will always exist as it is virtually impossible to get all the information required. The true skill is in being able to identify the critical intelligence gaps and to **narrow** them as much as possible. The analyst will continue to examine the information as it arrives, describing the situation as it is reported to them and looking for inconsistencies within the data that require clarification or areas where more information is required. This is the full analytical ambition of the situation report. It does not attempt to measure or assess current or future threat but simply states the current serious and organized crime situation which exists in this national environment and to understand more we need to narrow these intelligence gaps.

72. **In order to produce a forward looking SOCTA designed to provide a nation State with the right information to pro-actively tackle future threats from serious and organized crime then further and much deeper analysis has to be applied.** The following paragraphs outline one possible methodology. However, there are several other possible alternatives given the number of different analytical tools and techniques available. Some of these are given in annex II but to ensure the best methodology is developed for each country—and the correct tools and techniques are properly applied—the training that complements this Handbook should be followed.

<sup>15</sup> Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, Richards J. Heuer Jr, Centre for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1999.

73. There are many elements and issues to consider when producing a threat assessment and of supreme importance is to define “threat”. There is no, one, simple definition of threat that can be applied across all environments. However there are certain elements to the concept of threat that tend to remain constant. These include terms such as **capability, intention, risk, harm, vulnerability and probability**. It is important to recognize—once again—the necessity of having a properly understood and agreed on ToR as this will include a definition of threat and the methodology will detail how analysing this threat will be achieved. The model below gives one example of how these elements are inter-linked.<sup>16</sup>

Figure 9. Example model of the concept of threat



74. In the model a threat will only exist if there is “intent” and “capability” to carry out the threat. If neither the intention nor the capability exists then the threat does not exist. Intention consists of the expectation of “success” and a “desire” to carry out the threat. If there is a perception that the threat will not succeed or there is no desire to carry out the threat then there is no intention and, therefore, no threat. Capability consists of the “knowledge” and “resources” to carry out the threat. Again, if either of those is missing there is no threat. In assuming that all four elements of success, desire, knowledge and resources exist then there is a threat. The probability of the threat occurring will be dependent upon the extent to which each of these elements has been developed. A 100 per cent expectation of success, desire, knowledge and resources results in a 100 per cent probability that the threat will occur.

<sup>16</sup>As noted in the body of the text there are many different models linking these elements together, for example capability and capacity could be argued as better indicators of vulnerability than harm and control and that “harm” should sit on the “threat” side of the equation.

75. Simply because there is a 100 per cent chance of the threat occurring does not mean that there is a 100 per cent chance of it succeeding. The success will depend upon the “vulnerability” of that which is threatened. This, in turn, is determined by the “harm” (or impact) caused by the threat and the “control” mechanisms in place to reduce the vulnerability. Where there is no harm caused by the threat, or the control mechanisms are 100 per cent effective, then there is no vulnerability.

76. In the real world of serious and organized crime these absolutes of 100 per cent or 0 per cent seldom exist. As a result there often exists a situation where threat and vulnerability meet. When this occurs there is “risk”. In defining threat for a national SOCTA the needs of the client will have to be very well understood. Do they want the elements of risk considered as well i.e. the possible harms from the threat and the control mechanisms in place to reduce the vulnerability? Ultimately it is a matter of preference whether it’s called a risk or threat assessment, what is important is that the client and the analyst agree on what is to be provided and how it will be achieved. Once again the issue of a properly negotiated and understood ToR including the methodological approach is vital. This will include definitions on each of the elements of the model.

77. Once the ToR and, by extension therefore, the aims and objectives of the SOCTA has been agreed to and the situation report constructed, there are various analytical tools and techniques that can be applied to the information to provide the required SOCTA outcome(s). Before examining these however there are some elements to strategic analysis which are common regardless of the type of analytical approach taken. These are the “human” elements and their influence on the analysis has to be recognized. Previously noted in this section (paragraph 68) is perception and linked to this is the concept of **rationality**. The analyst has to be aware when conducting their analysis that what may appear as an irrational decision taken by an individual is—from that individual’s perspective—wholly rational. It is incumbent upon the analyst to recognize that rationality is relative to the individual and to factor this into their analysis. It requires the analyst to put themselves in the position of the person or group they are analysing. For example, it may not make any rational sense from the analyst’s perspective for a person to randomly select and kill a law enforcement officer. The individual committing that act though may have done it to prove his worthiness in joining a particular crime group.

78. Also linked to perspectives and rationality are **assumptions**. These are short-cuts that analysts have to take in a world of too much information. Assumptions are necessary to move analysis forward, what is crucial is that the analyst recognizes the assumption and—where it is important to the analysis itself—highlights this in the methodology. For example there may be a particular group of individuals involved in people smuggling. A key assumption may be that this group is involved in this activity for financial gain and this will affect the analytical approach. If the assumption is made that the group is actually involved in people smuggling because they want to help others to find a better life and that profit is not a motive then this would change the analytical approach.

79. All of these human factors with regard to analysis come under the umbrella of meta-cognition, in other words thinking about thinking. The analyst has to appreciate the influence that **perspectives, rationality and assumptions** can have on their analysis and to take what steps they can to reduce that impact.

## F. Production (“and now the SOCTA”)

80. Once an acceptable situation report has been produced this acts as the baseline for producing the SOCTA. As identified previously it is important to know what you know and to identify intelligence gaps before embarking upon a full, national threat assessment. The added value of the threat assessment is the ability to go beyond describing the environment and conducting a risk analysis to prioritize threats. The complementary process to achieve this is the SWOT analysis and argument building that underpins the SOCTA recommendations.

81. There are a number of analytical approaches that can be taken to assist in the production of the SOCTA. The tasking and ToR will determine which of these approaches, or which combination of approaches, should be used (the methodology). Thus the approaches shown below are provided to allow the analyst creating the SOCTA the opportunity to choose the approach(es) that will best fit their own clients’ needs and provide the greatest added value.

### Step 7—SWOT analysis

82. Within the law enforcement environment **SWOT analysis** is often used as a logical compliment to PESTEL analysis. The term SWOT stands for Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats. Having conducted the PESTEL analysis the analyst will have identified some of the key “drivers” for serious and organized crime within their particular law enforcement environment. SWOT analysis can now be applied to help in assessing how serious and organized crime might exploit these drivers and what barriers may exist in reducing their capability to exploit them. The Strength and Weakness part of the analysis concentrates on the strengths and weaknesses of the organized crime group (OCG) and the Opportunity and Threat part focuses on the opportunities and threats that the market place (the environment) offers.

### Step 7—SWOT analysis—example

The following may be some key elements to consider in a SWOT analysis of an OCG involved in heroin trafficking in country X.

Strengths:

- Internal organization and structure.
- Resources and skills available to the group.
- Large, closely knit criminals providing support nationally and internationally.

**Weaknesses:**

- Lack of trust within group members.
- Unwillingness to cooperate with other OCGs.
- High profile of OCG attracting law enforcement attention.

**Opportunities:**

- Relaxing border controls offering entry to new market places.
- Change of political priorities away from drug trafficking.
- Removal or reduction in state funded drug addiction centres.

**Threats:**

- Expansion of a rival OCG into the market place.
- Legislative change introducing harsher punishment for OCG membership.
- National social awareness campaign on drug abuse.

83. This SWOT analysis technique can also be used on other types of organizations. For example it could be conducted on a law enforcement agency, examining its own internal strengths and weaknesses and the opportunities and threats that exist in its environment, in the fight against serious and organized crime.

***Building arguments***

84. Using the above techniques of PESTEL and SWOT the analyst will now be **building arguments**. The analyst has to demonstrate why their explanation is valid and includes various elements such as facts, statements, inductive and deductive reasoning. The SOCTA should encompass the ethos of good inductive analysis which is taking the information available and going “beyond the facts” to provide in-sight and illumination.

85. The analyst will take the facts (individual items of knowledge) and from related facts will build a statement reflecting a key point. These statements will then be taken and a hypothesis will be developed; a hypothesis being a reasoned argument. For example;

Fact: Socrates is a man.

Fact: All men are mortal.

*Statement: Socrates is mortal (deductive reasoning).*

This is known as deductive reasoning where the statement must be true, given the facts from which it is derived.

Fact: John Smith associates with known criminals.

Fact: John Smith has no visible income.

Fact: John Smith lives a very expensive lifestyle.

*Statement: John Smith makes his money from criminality (inductive reasoning).*

This is known as inductive reasoning where the statement may be true, given the facts from which it is derived. It is possible that John Smith won the state lottery or has rich parents. A series of related statements are then used to produce the heart of analysis, the hypothesis.

Statement: John Smith makes his money from criminality.

Statement: The majority of John Smith's associates have links to drug trafficking.

Statement: John Smith owns a small yacht which his son pilots regularly.

*Hypothesis: John Smith organizes drug importations using a yacht piloted by his son.*

86. The hypothesis should now be tested in an attempt to prove or disprove its validity and this may require further data collection. The analyst should also try and identify alternative hypotheses from the same information. This helps ensure that no undue bias is placed upon the analysis by only considering one option. This is known as the **analysis of competing hypotheses (ACH)**. The building and testing of hypotheses is the central theme of analysis and ultimately any recommendations will be constructed around the hypotheses provided by the analyst.

Figure 10. From information to intelligence

INFORMATION + ANALYSIS = INTELLIGENCE

87. As noted previously the person commissioning the SOCTA may wish it consider the vulnerability of society and the state to a threat from serious and organized crime. When assessing vulnerability one of the component parts is **harm**. The analyst should consider not just the obvious and immediate harm caused by the threat such as the loss of life but the further after-effects and ramifications. For example, drug trafficking brings obvious harm to the health of the drug addict however there could be secondary harm to society. The addict may steal money or goods to pay for their drugs, the state may end up paying medical treatment costs. There could even be further, wider implications if the country is viewed by others as one where there is a large drug abuse problem. This could affect tourism, inward investment etc.


88. The other component part of vulnerability is the **control mechanism** in place to counteract the threat. This is simply the existing counter-measures already in place to reduce the vulnerability of whatever is being threatened. This could be the physical protection of buildings, people, etc, or could be the processes and procedures that are in place to help reduce the vulnerability. For example the existence of an anti-drug trafficking law enforcement department.

89. There are many analytical tools and techniques for helping identify the drivers of threat and creators of vulnerability. **Market profiling and criminal business analysis** are two such techniques using the 5W1H approach (see paragraph 63) and can be extremely useful in producing a SOCTA. More detail on these and other techniques is given in annex II.

90. A useful analytical tool to identifying vulnerability is to use a **flow chart**. The flow chart is a diagrammatical representation of any process where there is a flow. In the law enforcement environment this could be a flow of drugs, money, weapons, communication etc. The flow chart can assist in identifying areas of vulnerability within the process, improve organizational knowledge of a particular process by examining the modus operandi, reveal opportunities for law enforcement disruption and highlight intelligence gaps.

91. Flow charting requires the analyst to break the process down into the key sequential, dependent and parallel events for a particular flow. The example shown below is a simplified flow chart for the smuggling of migrants into the European Union.

**Figure 11. Flow chart for smuggling of migrants into the EU**





The example shown above is a simplified flow chart for the smuggling of migrants into the European Union. It identifies some of the key elements in the process and the order in which they occur. From the chart we can discern that at some point there has to be a successful border crossing. This may take different forms but the chart highlights this as a key vulnerability in the process. It also highlights the supply of transportation and documentation as key components. These in-sights could form the basis for areas in which to focus law enforcement counter measures.

92. Having now used a series of analytical tools and techniques to identify and assess the component parts of threat and vulnerability we are now in the position to assess the risk. Where threat (a person or a group of individuals with the desire, expectation of success, knowledge and resources to execute an illegal act) and vulnerability (possible harm and inadequate control) meet, then a risk exists. These risks can then be analysed to determine prioritisation and control strategies.

### Step 8—Risk analysis<sup>17</sup>

93. There are three discrete stages within the risk analysis process:


#### *Identification*

The identification of the risk may come from the client during stage 1 of the intelligence cycle i.e. from the direction, planning and tasking. It may also be analytically driven i.e. analysis of a certain subject highlights hitherto unidentified potential risks.

#### *Analysis*

The analysis of risk is inherently difficult within a law enforcement environment as it usually requires some form of quantitative judgement to be made using data that does not easily lend itself to be used in such a fashion. Remembering that risk is a culmination of all component parts of threat and vulnerability it follows that a risk analysis is a combination of all previous analysis undertaken to determine threat and vulnerability. Risk analysis attempts to measure and then prioritise the identified risks and this is usually done through the use of a matrix.

**Figure 12. Risk analysis matrix**



<sup>17</sup>Although not strictly part of a threat assessment, risk analysis allows the threats identified through the SOCTA process to be prioritized and it assists in the recommendation writing phase. As such it was decided to include risk analysis within this Handbook.

94. The matrix shown above is a simple two-by-two matrix which can be used to help determine priorities for action to be taken against identified risks. Therefore if previous analysis has identified one threat as having a high probability of happening and a high impact should it occur then the risk falls into the ‘immediate action required’ box. If a threat is measured as having a low probability and high impact then that risk should be dealt with “as soon as possible” i.e. directly after the “immediate action required” risks have been managed. High probability and low impact should be dealt with “in due course” and low probability and low impact should be “monitored” to ensure they remain low probability and low risk.

95. This approach is very simplified and many organizations use a more complex three-by-three matrix.<sup>18</sup> It also does not take account of one other issue, namely time. For example virtually all scientists are agreed that in approximately 5-7 billion years our sun will either explode or implode and destroy the Earth. Using the matrix that means there is a high probability of it happening and an exceptionally high impact! Does that mean there is “immediate action required”? Obviously not since the risk is so far into the future as to make planning for it just now meaningless.

### *Control*

96. Having assessed and prioritized the risks consideration should be given to how those risks can be controlled. There are five traditional risk control methods.

(i) *Prevention*. This means the complete elimination of the risk by reducing either the vulnerability or threat to 0 per cent. As previously discussed this is almost impossible to achieve.

(ii) *Reduction*. This is the more likely outcome from any attempt to prevent the risk. It involves considering all elements of the risk and identifying in which area(s) effort should be made to reduce the risk. Can the threat be best reduced by targeting the resources available to the individual or group creating the threat? Can the vulnerability be reduced by introducing new and more frequent border control checks?

(iii) *Transference*. This requires that the risk is transferred to someone or something else. In the world of private business this usually entails buying insurance. Within law enforcement it may not be acceptable to transfer criminal activity from one region to another or from one state to another although some policing strategies may have this effect. For example the introduction of closed circuit television (CCTV) in a city centre may displace crime to surrounding areas not covered by CCTV.

(iv) *Acceptance*. This is an acknowledgement that it is not worth the cost of controlling the risk. These will most probably be the low impact risks as identified within the impact/probability matrix.

<sup>18</sup> National Policing Improvement Agency (2008) “Practice Advice on Analysis”.

(v) *Contingency*. This accepts that the risk exists but also provides a plan of action should the risk materialize. Many local and state governments have contingency plans in the case of natural disaster etc.

### Step 9—Recommendation writing

97. Having conducted the risk analysis the analyst should now be writing recommendations that the client may wish to consider. These will be based around the hypotheses that the analyst has constructed during their analysis and those key intelligence gaps that have emerged. At this stage there will be value in consulting with others, in particular subject matter experts (SMEs), as they may have greater in-sight into the type of recommendations that will have the greatest impact. This input, however, should not compromise the analysts' integrity in developing unbiased recommendations since many SMEs and other stakeholders could have their own reasons for supplying certain suggestions for recommendations. The analytical process in constructing the SOCTA should have already supplied the analyst with enough information to formulate sensible, unbiased recommendations. When writing recommendations the analyst should try and make them **S.M.A.R.T.** This means they should be:

- Specific: General recommendations such as “improving international cooperation” should be avoided. Make them specific and detailed.
- Measurable: The success of the recommendation should be capable of being judged.
- Attainable: They should be realistic.
- Relevant: They should reflect the outcome of the analysis.
- Timely: They should be time relevant.

### Step 9—Recommendation writing—example

- It is recommended that the government change the penalties for membership in an organized crime group (as defined under current legislation) from 5 years to 25 years imprisonment. This change should occur as soon as possible and certainly within the next 24 months. This is a SMART recommendation as:
  - It provides enough detail for it to be accomplished (specific);
  - Organized crime group membership can be monitored (measurable);
  - Change in national legislation is something the state can control (attainable);
  - A hypothesis states; there is no effective deterrent for OCG membership (relevant);
  - A suggested timescale given (timely).

98. Providing a SOCTA requires the analyst to take a large subject area and find some method of breaking it down into manageable pieces and examining the threat before reconstructing it with a forward looking perspective. The process developed through this Handbook has described some methods for achieving this breakdown and reconstruction, for example; brainstorming the task, PESTEL, SWOT, flow and risk analysis along with the additional tools and techniques given in annex II.

99. The analysis stage of the intelligence cycle is now complete. The tasking has been agreed, the relevant information has been collected, collated, evaluated, the appropriate analytical methodology identified and the relevant analytical tools and techniques applied and suitable recommendations written. As this process has advanced the report writing will have been progressing. It is now time to pull all the elements together to provide the completed product.

## G. Dissemination and feedback

100. The dissemination stage completes the intelligence cycle and is marked by the delivery of the final product to the client. In the case of a national SOCTA this will take the form of a **written report**. The provider of the report may also be asked to present and defend the product **orally** with the client and other interested parties.

### Step 10—Disseminating the results

101. There are a number of elements to consider with regard to the production of the written report but of crucial importance is to recognize and remember that the report is written to assist the client in their understanding. The report should be a vehicle for comprehension. To assist in this objective the following points should be addressed:

*The structure of the report*—An example of a report structure is given in this section (paragraph 104). To summarize, the report should have:

- A beginning. This includes an introduction and will highlight the tasking, terms of reference and also the methodology.
- The middle. This is the bulk of the report, including the analysis and demonstrates that the task defined in the beginning has been achieved.
- An end. This is the conclusion which summarizes the key judgements, intelligence gaps and provides recommendations where required.

*The format of the report*—The report should be consistent throughout using the same font. Consider breaking up blocks of text with pictures, diagrams, bullet points, side bars, etc. New chapters should be started on a new page and headings should not start at the bottom of a page. Issues such as the production of hard copies and electronic copies in various formats such as .pdf files should be addressed.

*The style of the report*—Consider the language and style of the report and remember it should be tailored to the needs of the client. Take care when using abbreviations or “jargon” (professional slang) as this may not be readily understood by the reader of the report. Consider having a glossary of important terms and abbreviations. When sources are referenced within the report there should be sufficient detail to allow the reader to assess the validity of the source, unless the source has specifically asked not to be revealed (see classification paragraph 54 and handling codes paragraph 55).

*The content of the report*—The report should make quite clear the following elements:

- Key judgements supported by logical arguments i.e. the culmination of the analysis.
- Intelligence gaps identified through the analysis.
- Recommendations which are S.M.A.R.T. (see paragraph 97) and developed from the analysis.

102. It is important when conducting the analysis to constantly review the work undertaken to ensure it remains focussed on the task. Similarly it is important upon completion of the first draft of the report to have it critically reviewed by a peer group and, if possible, by external parties which may include some of those involved in the initial brainstorming. The draft report should be proof read from a hard copy and be marked as “draft”.

103. Once the report has been reviewed, proof read and approved it is ready for dissemination. At this point the classification and handling codes of the document should be verified and a distribution list of those receiving the report should be created. Each copy should be individually numbered and referenced to each recipient. This audit trail is essential should there be further, unauthorized dissemination of the report.

104. As identified earlier the written report may be accompanied by an **oral presentation**. This is a further opportunity for the message contained within the report to be disseminated. The presenter should consider the following elements:

#### *Before the presentation*

Understand the purpose of the briefing. Is it to highlight key judgements, discuss recommendations, explain the methodology or is it to summarize the entire report? Know the audience, how long is available for the presentation, the style of presentation (use of visual aids etc.) and rehearse the briefing.

#### *During the presentation*

Decide whether the briefing should be read from a prepared script or if the use of “prompt” notes is sufficient. Are questions to be taken during the briefing or held until its conclusion?

*After the presentation*

Is any follow-up required if promises were made to clarify some issues or rework some elements of the report?

**Step 10—Report structure—example***Foreword*

This section is usually written by the Head of the organization/department commissioned to produce the document. It will cover why it's been done and what it hopes to achieve as well as thanking the various contributors to the document.

*Executive summary*

This section is optional and is only included if the document is particularly long or is aimed at those unlikely to read the full document. If included it will contain the key judgements, intelligence gaps and recommendations of the report and will be relatively short (1 to 2 pages).

*Introduction*

This section will set the scene in a little more detail than the foreword, putting the document in the context of national law enforcement tasking and coordination. It will expand on the background to, and development of, the report highlighting some of the key difficulties faced and the major advances made.

*Aims and objectives (alternatively terms of reference)*

This section provides the reader with a thorough knowledge of what was required, by whom and how it was produced. It will include the tasking definition and terms of reference, highlighting the methodology used to produce the report.

*The main body of the report*

This section contains the actual analysis and will be broken down into logical subsections dependent upon the methodology and analytical approaches used. It forms the largest part of the report and contains all the information the reader requires to validate the analysis made within the entire document. It will highlight key judgements and intelligence gaps.

*Conclusions*

This section briefly reviews the document highlighting the key judgements and intelligence gaps. All information in the conclusions should be contained elsewhere within the report. Nothing new should be introduced in this section.

### *Recommendations*

This section will provide recommendations to combat the threats identified within the SOCTA. Not all clients request recommendations and this should be agreed during the negotiation of the ToR. These recommendations should be S.M.A.R.T.

105. Having committed time, effort and various other resources into completing the SOCTA **feedback** on the value of the SOCTA should be obtained. This is undertaken to assess the impact of the SOCTA and to help improve the process and methodology for subsequent, similar reporting.


### Step 11—Feedback

106. The feedback could be generated from providing a feedback form along with the report which asks the recipients for their critical comments around the key areas of usefulness, timeliness and accuracy. It should be noted that the usual return rate of feedback questionnaires is around 10 per cent so a pro-active approach to encourage their completion and return may be required.

107. It may be possible to arrange a meeting with the key stakeholders to discuss in a semi-structured format the value of the SOCTA and how it could be improved. This meeting should be moderated by an impartial chair and built around a set of questions and areas for discussion linked to the SOCTA content and previously circulated to the participants ahead of the meeting.


108. The value of the SOCTA may also become apparent from the monitoring of suitable indicators linked to the SOCTA outcomes. For example a recommendation that the length of prison sentencing for synthetic drug production be increased could be monitored, or if an intelligence gap that existed around knowledge of arms trafficking is narrowed.

**Figure 13. The intelligence cycle**



The dissemination of the SOCTA to the client, coupled with managing the feedback, completes the intelligence cycle. The SOCTA—by fulfilling the tasking set and agreed by those commissioning the document—delivers the right information to allow for intelligence-led decisions to be taken by the appropriate policymakers. The key findings, intelligence gaps and recommendations from the SOCTA also help form the next cycle of planning, direction and tasking. This continuous process ensures a cohesive, effective and improving national response to the threat from serious and organized crime.

## H. Part Two—checklist



1. Are the resources in place for a SOCTA?
2. Have the appropriate training needs been identified and provided?
3. Who will participate in the brainstorming sessions? e.g. law enforcement agencies, government departments, international organizations, academia, private/public sector.
4. Do we have a clear terms of reference?
5. Have we identified the broad areas for data collection?
6. Have we established a data collection plan and identified suitable sources?
7. Where and how will we store and secure the information?



8. What system are we using for evaluating the information?
9. Have we completed an environmental scan?
10. Have we identified intelligence gaps?
11. Have we applied the relevant analytical techniques?
12. Is the style of the report logical?
13. How was the report used?



# PART THREE

## Training for using a SOCTA

109. This Handbook attempts to provide enough generic information and guidance to allow the user to develop a basic national SOCTA. However the subject area is so broad, national differences so unique and the analytical skills required so specialized that no generic handbook could cover all that is required in enough depth to provide a tailored national SOCTA. Therefore it is envisaged that training should be provided to those expected to use and complete a national SOCTA.

110. The training will supply a suitable skill set to the appropriate individual(s) identified to prepare a SOCTA while recognizing their own national environment and available resources. The training should last for one working week of 40 (forty) hours and build upon the methodology promulgated within this Handbook.

111. The first day of the training is also aimed at the managers of the SOCTA process and the persons commissioning the SOCTA—the users. It is strongly recommended that as many of these individuals as possible attend the first day of the training. This will help cement the relationship between the different parties involved in the entire SOCTA project. It will also provide an opportunity to discuss possible problems and have them resolved quickly.

112. A potential timetable is provided below along with brief learning objectives for each element.

113. The training is split into five core modules (CM) and is aimed at ensuring the theory can be usefully applied.

Figure 14. Proposed timetable for the SOCTA training

		1	2	3	4	5
1	08.30 - 09.20	Course introduction	Creative thinking	Collection planning	Analytical approaches	Risk
2	09.30 - 10.20	Intelligence and law enforcement	Exercise 1a; brainstorming	Information management		Exercise 9; Risk
	10.20 - 10.40	Morning break				
3	10.40 - 11.20	What is a SOCTA?	Exercise 1b; Mind mapping	Environmental scanning (PESTEL)	Threat	Indicators and warnings
4	11.30 - 12.20	Planning a SOCTA	Exercise 1c; The six hats	Exercise 3; PESTEL	Exercise 6; Threat	Exercise 10; Indicators and warnings
	12.20 - 13.30	Lunch break				
5	13.30 - 14.20	Commissioning a SOCTA	Terms of reference (defining the task)	Logic	Vulnerability	Scenario writing
6	14.30 - 15.20	Discussion; How to make a SOCTA work		Exercise 4; Logic	Exercise 7; Vulnerability	Exercise 11; Scenario writing
	15.20 - 15.40	Afternoon break				
7	15.40 - 16.30	Psychology of analysis	Exercise 2; terms of reference	Building arguments	SWOT analysis	Dissemination
8	16.40 - 17.30		Terms of reference—presentation	Exercise 5; hypothesis development	Exercise 8; SWOT analysis	Case study
End						

### Day 1

#### CM1a—Course introduction

Introduce the participants to each other and the trainer

Introduce the main elements of the course

Determine what the participants expect from the course

#### CM4a—Intelligence and law enforcement

Difference between information and intelligence

Intelligence-led policing, what it is and why it's a good idea

How a national SOCTA fits into an intelligence-led approach

### CM2a—What is a SOCTA?

Reviewing part 1 of the Handbook; Why we need it, what it is, key elements to consider

### CM2b—Project planning

Elements to consider when planning a large project

Tying those elements (people, time, interdependencies etc.) into a SOCTA

### CM2c—Commissioning a SOCTA

What those commissioning the SOCTA want (the tasking)

The different demands made—and pressures brought to bear—of the analyst and how to cope with those demands and pressures

Followed by open floor discussion on the issues raised so far concentrating on good practice vs. organizational culture i.e. what will work, what won't work, why and how it might be resolved

### CM1b—Psychology of analysis

Considering the “human” elements of analysis concentrating on perception, rationality and assumptions and how they affect our analysis

Looking at coping mechanisms for dealing with these human elements, the marriage of art and science.

## *Day 2*

### CM1c—Creative thinking

Highlighting the need for creative thinking in analysis

Considering different creative thinking techniques

Combining three of these techniques, brainstorming, mind mapping and the six hats in practical exercises.

### CM2b—Terms of reference (defining the task)

Considering the importance of proper task definition

What is a conceptual model and how it can assist in determining scope

Writing a methodology

Practical exercise using all elements learned to date to produce a completed terms of reference

*Day 3*

## CM4b—Collection planning

The need for a collection plan

Different types of collection plan

Elements of a collection plan including sources, resources, third party collection

## CM4b—Information management

The elements of a good IM system

Evaluation of information focussing on the use of the 4 x 4 (four by four) system

## CM3b—Environmental scanning (PESTEL)

What is an environmental scan

Why does it need to be done

Identifying some environmental scanning techniques focussing on PESTEL analysis followed by a practical exercise using PESTEL analysis

## CM1d—Logic

Critical thinking

Going beyond the facts; inductive and deductive reasoning

## CM1e—Building Arguments

Key elements to building an argument

Using models to build arguments

*Day 4*

## CM3c—Analytical approaches

Examining some other analytical tools and techniques for possible use in a SOCTA

The value of the 5W1H (who, what, when, where, why and how questions)

## CM3d—Threat

The elements of threat; intention, capability etc.

How can we “measure” threat; probability

Practical exercise on assessing threat

## CM3e—Vulnerability

The elements of a vulnerability; harm and control

Considering primary, secondary and tertiary harm

Practical exercise on assessing vulnerability

### CM3f—SWOT analysis

The elements of SWOT; strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats

When and to what to apply SWOT analysis

Practical exercise in applying SWOT technique

### Day 5

#### CM3g—Risk analysis

The elements of risk; identification, analysis and control

Recommendation writing including SMART recommendations

Practical exercise in risk comparison

#### CM3h—Indicators and warnings

What are indicators and how do they provide warnings

The art of identifying good indicators

Practical exercise in developing indicators and warnings

#### CM3i—Scenario writing

What are scenarios and how might they assist law enforcement

How are they constructed, the key elements of the process

Practical exercise on writing scenarios

#### CM5a—Dissemination

The final product; the message and the messenger

Oral and written dissemination

#### CM5b—Case study

Reviewing an already completed SOCTA against the training delivered

Final discussion on training. Has it met the expectations of the participants?

114. The need for complementary training of some description for any person or group of people charged with constructing a SOCTA cannot be overstated. Many of the concepts, tools and techniques explained throughout this handbook will only be successfully applied with tuition and “hands-on” experience. Throughout the body of this Handbook several key words are highlighted **in bold**. These are elements that require close attention and will be more fully explained within the training.

115. This training should be tailored to suit the participants taking cognisance of any existing analytical ability and the environment in which they operate. Thus no two training courses will ever be exactly the same as the practical exercises throughout the training should be written with these factors taken into consideration. Upon completion of this week of training the participant should have enough confidence and competence to produce a worthwhile SOCTA.





# ANNEX I

## Example SOCTA

The following is provided as an abridged example of a SOCTA that might be produced by using the approach detailed in this Handbook. It should be remembered that each SOCTA will vary depending upon national circumstance and tasking.

### **The Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment for Country X**

Contents	<i>No.</i>
Foreword by the Prime Minister or the Minister of the Interior	x
Executive summary	x
Introduction	x
Terms of reference	
Tasking	x
Methodology	x
The current situation	
Crime types	x
Crime groups	x
Current environment	x
The threat posed by serious and organized crime	
Crime types	x
Crime groups	x
Future environment	x
Conclusions	x
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## Foreword by the Minister of the Interior

It is with great pleasure that I introduce the first national Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) produced by our State. The SOCTA is, as its name suggests, is a threat assessment of current and expected new trends in serious and organized crime within our State. The assessment is based upon existing knowledge and expertise and it is drawn up in order to enable decision makers to take the appropriate action to counter the anticipated threat.

A great number of people and various organizations have contributed to the production of the SOCTA. This deserves to be recognized. All national law enforcement agencies provided valuable contributions as have other institutions at a national level such as the Department of Social Services. Additionally, a number of third parties provided valuable assistance in building up the picture of serious and organized crime as it impacts upon the State. We are additionally grateful to our law enforcement partners in neighbouring countries for their cooperation. The approach taken in producing this work has also seen consultation with a number of partners from the private sector and academia and their cooperation has added significant value to the SOCTA. Nor should the most valuable assistance of The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) be overlooked as they supplied the SOCTA Handbook and associated training that gave impetus to the entire process.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the staff of the State Ministry of the Interior deserve recognition for their efforts to produce this document. I appreciate and thank them for their ongoing efforts in the production and development of this significant and pioneering work. The SOCTA will be an important step to raise the level of cooperation between various competent authorities within the State as well as with our other national and international partners. This will contribute to further develop the common goals of defeating serious and organized crime.

## Executive summary

The threat from serious and organized crime to this State is real. It comes in many different guises and can have a negative impact in many different ways. This SOCTA details these threats and prioritizes those anticipated to cause the greatest harm in the future.

One of the **key findings** from this SOCTA is the high level of threat that trafficking in human beings (THB) poses to this State when conducted by international organized crime groups (OCGs) that are based outside our State but have strong links inside our State. This is assessed as one of the top three threats that will be posed over the next five years. This threat has materialized due to the sophistication of OCGs new to our State who have a history of THB and their desire to exploit the increasing wealth being generated within the State. The market place for generating profit from prostitution is a generous one for these OCGs compounded by the fact that the State legislation against trafficking is weak. This coupled with our state policy of encouraging tourism and attracting international workers, means there will be a rising demand for sexual

services which the OCGs are willing to supply. The harm caused is manifold, in particular the increase in disease, political damage to the reputation of our State internationally and the increasing links between human and drug trafficking groups causing further harm within our State. This report **recommends** that stiffer penalties are introduced for THB offences by adopting the Palermo Convention and launching awareness campaigns warning sex tourists that their presence will not be tolerated.

## Introduction

This report was commissioned by the Minister of the Interior to help inform the Minister of appropriate courses of action to be taken against serious and organized crime within this State. It was initiated after discussion with various national and international bodies and organisations. There has been international recognition that in order to “join up” the fight against serious and organized crime each State should endeavour to identify the greatest threats posed to the State from serious and organized crime. Only by having that type of appreciation can we hope to effectively tackle these threats on a national and global scale.

Serious and organized crime has a major impact within this State. There is evidence throughout the country of the misery that drug trafficking has brought. Of the slavery that trafficking in human beings has created. Of the economic damage that corruption has delivered. Of the death that arms trafficking has produced. These are all areas in which serious and organized crime groups thrive and from which they earn their profits. This report is intended to help identify those threats, place them in a national context, prioritize them and suggest possible courses of action to help eliminate or reduce those threats.

## Terms of reference

Detailed below is the tasking that was agreed by the Minister of State for the Interior. The tasking was delivered to the National Police—Analysis Department on the 1 January with a deadline of 30 June. Following the tasking a methodology for the production of the report was subsequently designed and is reproduced to enhance the readers understanding of the approach taken.

### *Tasking definition*

The objective of this report is to provide a document which details the current and future major threats posed to the State from serious and organized crime. In addition the report intends to give guidance to policymakers on possible courses of action to be taken to reduce the impact of these threats. It will not cover the area of terrorism nor the links between terrorism and serious and organized crime. Furthermore the report does not consider crimes against person or property unless linked to serious and organized crime.

This report was commissioned by the Minister of State for the Interior to allow him and his office to enact policies, procedures and—where appropriate—suggest changes in legislation to improve the national response to the fight against serious and organized crime.

### *Resources*

The National Police—Analysis Department was charged with producing the SOCTA. There was a six month time-frame with one full-time analyst and one full-time researcher along with a project manager assigned to the SOCTA part-time (50 per cent).

### *Methodology*

The methodological approach taken was to produce a situation report by using information obtained from various sources that are detailed as footnotes throughout the report. Due to the sensitive nature of some of the information supplied not all sources have been disclosed. Interviews were also conducted with various officials currently involved in the fight against serious and organized crime. A brainstorming session determined that both the serious and organized crime groups and the crime types that they are involved in would be identified. A PESTEL analysis was then conducted to determine the key national environmental factors that facilitated the existence of these crime groups and crime types. The current national response to these OCGs and crime types was then identified and a situation report was compiled identifying critical intelligence gaps.

From the situation report a threat<sup>19</sup> assessment was constructed. This was achieved through a combination of different analytical techniques. Further data collection was conducted around the intelligence gaps identified through the situation report. A SWOT analysis was performed across the previously identified crime groups to identify common traits then a criminal business analysis coupled with market analysis assisted in determining the facilitating factors that allowed crime groups entry to their market place. Harm analysis then considered the possible impact those threats could have on society focussing on political, economic and social harm. Risk analysis then takes the threats identified and—utilizing the data from previous analysis—assesses the probability of the threat occurring with the overall harm that could be caused. This then provides a list of prioritized threats around which S.M.A.R.T recommendations are developed.

The indicators for each of the prioritized threats were identified from the data provided during the data collection phase and grouped together to provide an early warning system to law enforcement and policymakers. This was further developed into a number of scenarios that have been written to allow for effective, intelligence-led policy decisions to be taken quickly.

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<sup>19</sup>Threat is defined as “some person or group of people with the intention and capability to cause harm to the state and society”.

During the analysis certain assumptions have been made; in particular the motivating factor for individuals involved in serious and organized crime is the generation of profit. All analysis has been conducted from this perspective and no cognisance is made of ideological or peer pressure drivers. A further assumption is that the established OCGs will continue to work together where a connection already exists and will look to cooperate with other OCGs.

### *Sources*

This is a multi-source document with information being drawn from many different individuals and with many different organizations participating and contributing. Where appropriate these are detailed throughout the report.

### *The current situation*

Within this section the analysis is broken down into three main areas looking at crime types, crime groups and then how that fits into the current environment.

### *Crime types*

Trafficking in human beings (THB) has been reported in 12 of the 14 regional districts of the country. The majority of identified victims come from country Z and were not aware that they would be working as prostitutes upon their arrival. The incidence of sexually transmitted disease within the state is at its highest level ever recorded and is costing the state US\$ 50 million per annum to treat and it is estimated that organized crime makes over US\$ 800 million per annum from this crime.

Drug trafficking has been reported in eleven of the fourteen regional districts of the country. The types of illicit drugs are numerous however the most prevalent—accounting for over 80 per cent of reported cases—is heroin trafficking. The intravenous use of heroin and the sharing of needles by addicts are causing the spread of HIV. This is costing the state approximately US\$ 20 million to treat and organized crime makes over US\$ 500 million per annum from this crime.

### *Crime groups*

The organized crime group (OCG) known as The Bullet Boyz is heavily involved in the trafficking of human beings (THB). They are based in neighbouring country Z but conduct most of their criminality in our State and have established good working relationships with indigenous criminals who are involved in drug trafficking.

An ethnic, indigenous OCG is known to control the vast majority of drug trafficking into and throughout the state. Recently they have established international links with another OCG based in country Z known as The Bullet Boyz.

### *Current environment*

At present THB is a relatively low political priority. There is no State funding for any inter-agency forum—and no inter-agency communication—on THB for sexual exploitation. At present no shelters exist for the victims of THB and more usually the victims are arrested and fined for practising prostitution and then deported as illegal migrants. This can drive them back into the hands of their traffickers.

The increasing wealth of our State and the drive to attract international workers and tourism has increased the appeal of the State to traffickers in human beings. The majority of the money generated from this trafficking business does not stay within the State as the main group controlling the trafficking is based in country Z.

The state health services are coming under increasing pressure trying to cope with the increase in sexually transmitted disease. Law abiding members of society are starting to complain about the increasing number of prostitutes seen on the streets of our major cities.

### The threat posed by serious and organized crime

From information provided it can be assessed that there is an increase in the trafficking of women into country X for the purposes of sexual exploitation. The number of interceptions at the border of possible victims has increased by over 20 per cent on last year and government statistics highlight a growing number of non-indigenous women with sexually transmitted disease. The International Organization for Migration has also noted an increasing number of victims reporting to them from country X. This may be due to a larger numbers of workers from the international community now in country X along with an increase in gross domestic product and relative wealth of the indigenous population. All of these can act as pull factors for THB activities. Meanwhile the national legislation of country X does not recognize trafficking in human beings as an offence and the national legislature has to prosecute individuals under outdated kidnap or false imprisonment legislation.

One of the major **strengths** of The Bullet Boyz OCG involved in THB activities is their ability to work with other OCGs within our State and use their networks for mutual assistance. This insight plus the previously identified facts of weak legislation and low political will to tackle THB and illegal migration where country X is only a transit country leads to the following **hypothesis**: The Bullet Boyz OCG use their trafficking victims as drug “mules” to bring drugs into the State for the indigenous OCGs involved in drug supply and distribution within the State.

Their willingness to cooperate with other OCGs however is a potential **weakness** that could be exploited by law enforcement. It may provide an **opportunity** for an undercover officer to be introduced to this OCG given their willingness to deal with many different individuals.

The impact that this particular OCG can have on the State is potentially large. It is assessed that they are expanding their activities beyond THB by forging links with other OCGs in our State. They are moving into drugs trafficking and this will increase their sphere of influence. The **harm** that could be caused to the State includes international political difficulties as other States may view the flourishing sex trade as indicative of a poorly run state. Economic damage will be caused as the majority of money generated from these trafficked victims ends up outside our State and health care and other social costs have to be met from within the State budget. When compared against the other threats to the State it is assessed that the threat from this OCG and its involvement in THB activities should be placed within the top three priorities. In order to monitor this threat there are a series of indicators that can be measured and that have been identified through the previous analysis. These include:

- Incidence of sexually transmitted disease
- Number of migrants intercepted at border crossing points with country Z
- Number of street prostitutes arrested

Should all of these indicators increase over time then a **warning** will be generated and the appropriate State authorities will be informed.

### Conclusions

The lack of robust anti-trafficking legislation is doubtless an attractive feature for organized crime when looking for a place to expand their criminal enterprise. One of the major strengths of the main group identified as trafficking women for sexual exploitation is their ability to identify and exploit areas of weakness. They are further aware of the developing demand for sexual services within the State due to increasing national wealth and the influx of international workers and tourists. They are continuing to expand their THB business and are using their links with indigenous OCGs to expand their areas of criminality within the State.

### Recommendations

It is recommended that the state enshrines in national legislation the so-called “Palermo Protocol” aimed at preventing, suppressing and punishing trafficking in persons, especially women and children.

It is further recommended that an international awareness campaign is launched warning potential sex tourists that they will be arrested, prosecuted and—if found guilty—imprisoned for using the sexual services of a victim of trafficking.





# ANNEX II

## Analytical approaches<sup>20</sup>

As noted throughout this handbook the SOCTA is a strategic product but it should be remembered that there no such entity as “strategic intelligence” or “operational intelligence”. There is only information that is analysed and used for strategic or operational purposes. There are numerous different analytical tools and techniques that can be used to develop a SOCTA and some are better suited to providing the appropriate information than others but all have aspects which can be applied to SOCTA analysis. Some of these more suited techniques are briefly described below but it should be recognized that this is not a definitive nor exhaustive list and that many other tools and techniques exist.

### Criminal business analysis

Criminal business analysis (CBA) recognizes that serious and organized crime operates as a business to achieve its aims. Analysing how a criminal enterprise conducts its business will lead to a deeper understanding of how the criminal enterprise attempts to achieve its aim. This can then assist in predicting possible future criminal activity, identifying vulnerabilities in the criminal process and provide areas for further intelligence gathering. To achieve this deeper understanding the analyst must develop a sound conceptual model of the business activity. This might be achieved by examining how a legitimate business operates and then comparing that against the criminal enterprise. Approaching experts in the area may also provide insight for the analyst.

A key part of the methodology for completing a CBA is to consider the “5W1H questions” i.e. who, what, when, where, why and how. For example:

Who are the key members? Who have the specialist roles?

What is the nature and scale of the business? What is the organization’s ability to corrupt?

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<sup>20</sup>For a fuller and more detailed examination of these and other tools and techniques please see the UK National Policing Improvement Agency (2008) “Practice Advice on Analysis” [www.npia.police.uk/](http://www.npia.police.uk/)

When does the activity occur? When does it not occur?

Where does the activity occur? Where do key members live/travel etc?

Why? This is dependent upon the perspective taken by the analyst and will have been highlighted in the methodology (financial gain, ideological reasons etc.)

How do members communicate? How have MOs changed over time?

## Market analysis

Market analysis aims to identify the criminal market around a commodity or service, and can be used to describe any criminal market at any level. Similar to criminal business analysis (CBA) the analyst must develop a sound conceptual model of the market. Again asking experts in the field and/or identifying previous analysis undertaken will assist in this understanding.

A key part of the methodology for completing a market analysis is to consider the “5W1H questions” i.e. who, what, when, where, why and how. For example;

Who are the suppliers, customers and victims?

What is the nature and scale of the market? What are the supply and demand drivers?

When is the market active?

Where does the market operate (location)? Where is it strongest?

Why. This is dependent upon the facilitating factors identified through PESTEL, SWOT and other relevant analysis techniques.

How does the market operate? This is also linked to the facilitating factors and drivers.

## Crime pattern analysis

Crime pattern analysis (CPA) identifies the nature and scale of emerging and current crime and disorder trends, linked crimes or incidents, hot spots of activity and common characteristics of offenders and offending behaviour. Useful tools for CPA are maps, graphs and tables. The main sources of information for CPA are crime and incident reports. Patterns may be found within the detail of crime and incident reports, such as the location of the event, the type of property involved, or the method by which the event was progressed.

The main advantages of CPA are that it:

- Determines current, new or emerging problems;
- Predicts criminal activity;
- Identifies the most significant offenders in hot spots;
- Aids linking between committed offences and possible offenders;
- Focuses intelligence gathering;
- Highlights preventive, reduction or diversion opportunities;
- Can be used to make decisions about resources.

## Network analysis

Crime network analysis provides an understanding of the nature and significance of the links between people who form criminal networks, and organizations that interrelate. It also assesses the strengths and weaknesses of criminal groups or organizations.

Network analysis:

- Provides a detailed picture of the roles played by individuals, including their rank in a hierarchy and level of control.
- Supports the identification of intelligence gaps and subjects to target.
- Gives an understanding of scale and seriousness of the threat posed by criminal groups.
- Shows associations within and outside the network.
- Identifies key areas and possible tactics for investigation and disruption.
- Focuses intelligence gathering and provides information for making decisions about prevention, enforcement or intelligence responses.

Network analysis will often be developed using graphical software to demonstrate the links between individuals, locations, events and organizations. Charts are a useful briefing tool and will often accompany the final report. Carrying out a piece of network analysis often triggers the production of other analytical techniques, such as criminal business analysis and market analysis. Network analysis is also frequently used to support the development of other intelligence products.

## Demographic and social-trend analysis

Demographic and social-trend analysis (DSTA) examines how demographic and social changes within an area or within a demographic group can affect levels and types of crime and disorder. These changes may be an individual occurrence, such as a live music event, or may be, for example, a long-term change in either the ethnic make-up or age profile of a geographical area.

Demographic and social-trend analysis:

- Can be used to make decisions about resources at a strategic level;
- Highlights where future pressures on resources are likely to arise;
- Identifies current or emerging problems;
- Can be used to improve knowledge in relation to partnership working;
- Aids the planning process for seasonal or tactical operations in response to emerging social phenomena or movements of people;
- Highlights preventive, reduction or diversion opportunities;
- Helps to focus intelligence gathering;

In developing a DSTA the 5W1H questions are employed and the “what” questions are of particular value, for example:

- What is the nature of the trend/change examined?
- What is the background—ie, the situation prior to the change/trend? Consider PESTELO issues as well as demographic and crime data.
- What are the factors that have altered/are likely to alter?
- What factors may have caused/may cause changes in crime trends or offending behaviour?

Sources of information for a DSTA often come from outside traditional law enforcement circles and could include;

- Unemployment levels;
- Truancy rates;
- Homelessness levels;
- Details of socio-economic status;
- Population growth;
- Inward and outward population migration;
- Family size;
- Types of domestic, business and community premises;
- Ethnic origin of the population;
- The age of individuals living in an area.

## Indicators and warnings

Indicators—and the warnings that they inform—are the key predictive elements within analysis. They provide a method for monitoring the current situation for changes that may have a future impact upon the subject of the analysis. In terms of a national

SOCTA they provide a “watchtower” from which the analyst can survey the environment for changes that may have an adverse impact on society from serious and organized crime.

Indicators are the measurable “facts” upon which the analyst has built their hypotheses.

Fact: John Smith associates with known criminals.

Fact: John Smith has no visible income.

Fact: John Smith lives a very expensive lifestyle.

*Statement: John Smith makes his money from criminality (inductive reasoning).*

By monitoring these facts the analyst will be able to identify any changes which, when taken together, might provide a warning to law enforcement that (further) action should be taken. For example;

Fact: John Smith associates with more known criminals.

Fact: John Smith still has no visible income.

Fact: John Smith lives an increasingly expensive lifestyle.

*Warning: John Smith is making more money from criminality (inductive reasoning).*

The basis for developing good indicators is identifying information (facts) that can be measured and that properly inform the warning. As with all data collection it is important to ensure that you ask the right questions, of the right people, to get the right information. For example, there were a large number houses being broken into in one particular area. The police visited all the home owners in the area and asked if their house was secure, to which the answer was always “Yes”. The police then visited the local school and asked the home owners children “If you came home from school and were locked out of your house, could you get in?” To which the majority of children said, “Yes, there is a broken window at the back” or “the spare key is under the mat”, etc. The more accurate response came from asking the right question of the right people.

By constructing and then monitoring the right indicators and developing suitable warnings from associated indicators potential problems can be identified and dealt with before they become actual problems. This is a truly pro-active, intelligence-led law enforcement approach to tackling serious and organized crime.

The development of indicators allow for the monitoring of changes that may have an impact on future threats and vulnerabilities. Scenario writing use indicators to “predict” which particular scenario is unfolding, thus giving the decision maker an early opportunity to react to the developing future. It is this technique that allows for the time element highlighted during risk analysis to be accounted for (paragraph 93). “You don’t need to know the future. You just have to be prepared for it” (Pericles 55BC).

## Scenario writing

Scenario writing is resource intensive and requires a relatively refined analytical skill set in order to perform it well. Strategic planning, when looking into the future normally relies on a single, most-likely projection of future developments based on existing patterns instead of allowing for a multitude of possible developments. Scenarios are an option to overcome such limitations. Scenario writing tries to answer two basic questions;

What are the key factors that cause a particular future to develop?

What possibilities exist to influence these key steps?

The first stage in scenario writing therefore is to identify the **key factors** that will impact upon the future development of the subject area. This should be done using as much external input as possible ensuring a broad a range of ideas. For example the SOCTA may have highlighted an increasing threat to society and the state from the trafficking of human beings (THB) for the purposes of sexual exploitation. The analyst may look to write a number of possible scenarios around this increasing threat projecting 10 years into the future. The key influencing factors should be identified and these may include; demographic changes, improving economy, social acceptance of prostitution, political indifference, legislative changes, border control management, health issues, global warming, policing priorities, international pressure, internal trafficking, sex tourism, etc.

Once these factors have been identified they have to be prioritized. This is done through the process of **influence analysis**. All the key factors are placed in a matrix and compared against each other.

Figure 15. Influence analysis matrix


←	A	B	C	D
A				
B				
C				
D				

For example A could be border control management, B sex tourism, C legislative change and so on. An assessment is then made on how influential each factor is on the other factors. Those factors which have the greatest influence over the largest number

of factors are those that should be prioritized. Having done this the next step is to determine which of those prioritized factors can be influenced by the state. It would be difficult for a national government to influence global warming however it can influence legislative change.

It then falls to the analyst to begin writing the scenarios that may develop using the key, prioritized factors previously identified. One method is to take the top two of the prioritized factors and place them along x and y axis with the extremes of both axis being the opposite of each other. For example:

**Figure 16. Four scenarios, four perspectives**



The analyst will now write four scenarios taking four different perspectives. Scenario 1 will consider what the future looks like if prostitution is legalized and is socially accepted. The scenario will be written using some of the other identified factors. For example how would legalized, socially accepted prostitution impact upon health issues, organized crime, sex tourism, etc. Scenario 2 will consider socially acceptable, illegal prostitution against the same health, organized crime and sex tourism factors, and so on.

Once these scenarios have been written the appropriate **indicators** are chosen to monitor which scenario is developing, thus allowing for an **early warning** to be given should an undesirable future be unfolding. The majority of indicators will already have been identified through the previous analysis in the SOCTA that highlighted the increasing threat from THB.

It is the ability to quickly assess which future is unfolding and to then be able to react to it that makes scenario writing so useful. As previously noted however it is very resource intensive and for this reason they are still not widely used within the law enforcement environment.





# ANNEX III

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