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Citizen security in Latin America: Facts and Figures

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Citizen security in Latin America: The Hard Facts

Robert Muggah and Katherine Aguirre Tobón

Executive summary

Many Latin American countries, states and cities are facing a chronic public security crisis. In spite of more than a decade of modest economic growth, crime and victimization rates are rising, not dropping. Nevertheless, recent information of 2017 show some signs of improvement. Criminal violence is routinely singled out as one of the top concerns of citizens from across Mexico, Central America and South America. And there are warning signs that the region's high rates of criminal violence and victimization will continue rising if nothing is done.


Latin American priorities and approaches to public security have shifted over the past two decades, with growing attention devoted to citizen security. In contrast to traditional law and order approaches to crime, citizen security privileges a more comprehensive and people-centered conceptualization of security and safety – including more data-driven policing, smarter approaches to criminal justice, alternatives to incarceration, and investments in primary, secondary and tertiary prevention.

The following report sets out the broad parameters of Latin America's crime challenges and explores innovations in promoting public safety and citizen security. It also underlines the heterogeneity of Latin America's security environment, including the strong differences between regions, countries, states and cities. Taken together, the report issues a descriptive assessment of the scope and scale of the challenges, as well as opportunities for CAF to support partners in their efforts to prevent and reduce crime and improve safety for all Latin Americans.

The report’s executive summary sets out a number of key facts related to citizen security in Latin America. These facts are drawn from a wide range of sources. Find a detailed list of the sources of all graphs in Annex. Among the key findings are:

1. Latin America is home to 8% of the world’s population yet experiences 33% of the world’s homicides.


Comparison of population and homicides, world and LAC, 2012



Source: Population: World Bank (2017), Global Homicides: UNODC (2013)

2. More than 2.5 million Latin Americans have been killed violently since 2000, most of them due to intentional homicide.


Estimated absolute number of homicides in LAC by year



Estimated by Igarapé Institute - Homicide Monitor

- Latin America's regional homicide rate is roughly 21.5 per 100,000, more than three times the global average.

Average homicide rate (per 100,000) in 2012



Source: Global homicides: UNODC (2013), LAC homicides: Igarapé Institute - Homicide Monitor

- Over the past decade Latin America's regional homicide rate has increased 3.7% a year, three times the population growth rate of 1.1%.


Annual change in homicides



Source: Global homicides: UNODC (2013), LAC homicides: Igarapé Institute - Homicide Monitor

5. Given current trends, Latin America’s homicide rate is expected to reach 35 per 100,000 by 2030.

Projected regional and global dynamics in average homicide rates: 2000 to 2030



Note: With data retrieved from UNODC (2015). Average rates are for every 100,000 people and represent the average of the set of countries in each region.

*The asterisk denotes a projected figure.

Source: Vilalta, C (2015)

6. At least 17 of the top 20 most homicidal countries in the world are located in Central America, the Caribbean and South America. The region is still the world’s most murderous in 2017, but some of the most violent countries saw improvement -including El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala.


Top 20 countries by homicide rate, 2017 or latest year available.

Rank	Country	Region	Absolute number of homicides	Homicide rate (per 100,000)	Year
1	El Salvador	The Americas	3,954	60.0	2017
2	Jamaica	The Americas	1,616	56.0	2017
3	Venezuela	The Americas	16,046	53.7	2017
4	Honduras	The Americas	3,791	42.8	2017
5	Saint Kitts and Nevis	The Americas	23	42.0	2017
6	Lesotho	Africa	897	41.2	2015
7	Belize	The Americas	142	37.2	2017
8	Trinidad and Tobago	The Americas	494	36.0	2017
9	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	The Americas	39	35.5	2016
10	South Africa	Africa	18,673	34.3	2015
11	Saint Lucia	The Americas	57	34.0	2017
12	Bahamas	The Americas	123	31.0	2017
13	Brazil	The Americas	57,395	27.8	2016
14	Guatemala	The Americas	4,410	26.1	2017
15	Antigua and Barbuda	The Americas	20	25.0	2017
16	Colombia	The Americas	10,200	22.0	2017
17	Mexico	The Americas	25,339	20.4	2017
18	Puerto Rico	The Americas	670	19.4	2017
19	Namibia	Africa	372	17.2	2012
20	Dominica	The Americas	12	16.7	2013

Source: Igarapé Institute - Homicide Monitor

7. Homicidal violence is highly concentrated in the region with Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela accounting for 1 in 4 homicides globally.


Proportion of homicides of selected countries, 2016 or latest year available.



Source: Global homicides: UNODC (2013), LAC homicides: Igarapé Institute - Homicide Monitor

8. More than 141 of Latin American cities (52%) of the total, register homicide rates above the regional average (21.5 per 100,000).

Distribution of homicide rates by city, 2016 or latest year available.



Source: Igarapé Institute - Homicide Monitor


9. As of 2016, 43 of the 50 most homicidal cities in the planet were located in Latin America.

Top-50 of cities by homicide rate, 2016 or latest year available

Ranking	City	Country	Rate	Number	Year
1	San Salvador	El Salvador	136.7	432	2016
2	Acapulco de Juarez	Mexico	108.1	918	2016
3	San Pedro Sula	Honduras	104.3	807	2016
4	Soyapango	El Salvador	91.1	220	2016
5	Chilpancingo de los Bravo (Guerrero)	Mexico	88.1	994	2016
6	Distrito Central	Honduras	79.9	994	2016
7	Marabá	Brazil	76.7	207	2015
8	Grande Sao Luís	Brazil	74.5	868	2015
9	Guatemala	Guatemala	70.8	704	2016
10	Ananindeua	Brazil	69.6	616	2015
11	Choloma	Honduras	65.5	231	2016
12	Serra	Brazil	64.7	353	2015
13	Caruaru	Brazil	64.0	235	2015
14	Viamão	Brazil	61.9	138	2015
15	Cape Town	South Africa	61.5	2,469	2016
16	Belém	Brazil	60.9	710	2015
17	Victoria	Mexico	60.5	216	2016
18	Mossoró	Brazil	59.3	181	2015
19	St. Louis	US	59.3	188	2016
20	Aparecida de Goiania	Brazil	58.8	299	2015
21	Caucaia	Brazil	58.8	164	2015
22	Aracaju	Brazil	58.5	458	2015
23	Santa Ana	El Salvador	55.4	136	2016
24	Imperatriz	Brazil	54.5	169	2015
25	Manaus	Brazil	54.3	1,123	2015
26	Cali	Colombia	53.2	1,273	2016
27	Nelson Mandela Bay	South Africa	53.1	668	2016
28	Camacari	Brazil	53.0	168	2015
29	Baltimore	US	52.1	318	2016
30	Maceió	Brazil	51.8	655	2015
31	Betim	Brazil	51.5	228	2015
32	Cariacica	Brazil	51.1	169	2015
33	Natal	Brazil	50.9	470	2015
34	Villa Nueva	Guatemala	50.7	292	2016
35	Tijuana	Mexico	49.8	871	2016
36	Vitória da Conquista	Brazil	49.5	170	2015
37	Juazeiro do Norte	Brazil	47.4	142	2015
38	Buffalo City	South Africa	46.5	388	2016
39	Palmira	Colombia	46.3	142	2016
40	Culiacán	Mexico	46.3	439	2016
41	Mazatlán	Mexico	46.3	224	2016
42	Porto Alegre	Brazil	46.0	746	2015
43	Canoas	Brazil	45.4	164	2015
44	Detroit	US	44.9	303	2016
45	New Orleans	US	44.5	174	2006
46	Cuiabá	Brazil	43.8	268	2015
47	Joao Pessoa	Brazil	43.7	518	2015
48	San Juan (City in Puerto Rico)	Puerto Rico	43.4	155	2016
49	Kingston (city in Jamaica)	Jamaica	43.2	158	2016
50	Jaboatão dos Guararapes	Brazil	42.4	291	2015

10. Most victims of homicide are male. In Latin America, at least 80% of all murder victims are male as compared to a global average of 74%. In South America the proportion rises to 88% and in the Caribbean 83%.


Proportions of homicide by gender



Source: UNODC (2013)

11. Half of Latin American murder victims are between 15-29 years old, representing a tremendous human cost and considerable lost productivity.


Proportion of homicide 15-29 years old vs. rest. Latin America and the Caribbean



Source: Igarapé Institute - Homicide Monitor

12. The proportion of homicides involving firearms is exceedingly high in Latin America – 67% of murders in Central America, 53% of murders in South America and 51% of murders in the Caribbean. The global average of firearm-related homicides is 32%.


Proportion of homicides by instrument. 2016 or latest year available



Source: Igarapé Institute - Homicide Monitor

13. Gang-related violence plays a disproportionate role in homicides across Latin America (26% of all known cases) as compared to Europe or Asia.

Proportion of homicides by type



Source: UNODC (2013)

14. South America has the highest level of reported physical assaults and violent robberies in the world. Victimization surveys confirm high rates of these crimes.

Reported robberies (rate per 100,000) by regions and subregions. 2015 or latest year.

Sub-region	Reported robbery (rate per 100,000) - UNODC
South America	426.28
Central America	364.84
Western Europe	226.60
Southern Africa	150.04
Western Africa	132.00
Caribbean	116.17
Total	104.39
Northern America	70.59
Northern Europe	45.08
Australia and New Zealand	43.35
Southern Europe	43.12
Southern Asia	40.03
Central Asia	36.22
Eastern Africa	33.62
Eastern Europe	28.01
Northern Africa	27.61
South-Eastern Asia	20.50
Middle Africa	16.97
Western Asia	16.24
Eastern Asia	11.38
Melanesia	10.33

Source: UNODC Crime Statistics (2017)

15. Victimization surveys indicate that violence against women and children is pervasive. When asked to describe the most harmful types of violence, 65% of Latin American respondents claim it is violence against women and 63% say it is violence against children. This is higher than street violence (59%) and organized crime and gang-related violence (both 51%).

16. Victimization surveys report that 36% of all Latin Americans claim to have been a victim of a crime in 2016.

17. The countries with the highest level of victimization are Venezuela (48%), Mexico (46%) and Argentina (41%). The country with the lowest level of victimization is Ecuador (29%).

Level of victimization in Latin America in 2016

Country	%	Country	%
Venezuela	48	Paraguay	35
Mexico	46	Uruguay	35
Argentina	41	Costa Rica	35
Rep. Dom	41	Colombia	34
Peru	39	Panama	32
Honduras	38	El Salvador	31
Brazil	37	Nicaragua	31
Chile	37	Bolivia	30
Guatemala	36	Ecuador	29
LAC			36

Source: Bachelet (2016)

18. Latin Americans report feeling unsafe in their countries. Among the top ten world’s countries least likely to report feeling safe are Venezuela (just 14% say they feel safe), El Salvador (36%), Dominican Republic (36%), Peru (40%) and Mexico (40%).

19. And just 19% of Venezuelans report being confident in the police in 2015 – the lowest score of any country on the planet. By comparison, 32% of Afghans and 32% of Syrians report being confident in their police.

20. According to public surveys, when asked whether police “are involved in crime” 44% of Latin Americans responded affirmatively. In 7 of 18 countries, the percentage rises to above 50%.

21. High perceptions of police corruption are associated with high rates of criminal victimization. When societies believe that most police solicit bribes, there is as much as a 50% increase – in the probability of citizens reporting being victimized in a crime.

22. Public surveys suggest low trust in Latin America’s judicial institutions. According to surveys conducted between 2015 and 2016, the reported faith of Latin Americans in judicial institutions declined from 30% to 26%.

23. The sensation of fear and insecurity affects citizen’s confidence in the legitimacy of the political system. Research shows that individuals reporting low perception of crime report on average a 3% higher favourability of political institutions than those with a higher perception of crime.

24. High crime rates also affect people's mobility. The percentage of Latin Americans who report limiting their "places of recreation" for fear of being a victim of crime in 2012 ranged from 20.6-59.1%. The proportion of people who say they have limited the places they shop also ranges from 16.8% to 51.5%.

Latin Americans limiting recreation due to insecurity (2012)

Country	%
Chile	20.6
Panama	2.6
Argentina	23.6
Guatemala	24.6
Brazil	34.7
Peru	25.1
Uruguay	25.3
Colombia	25.8
Honduras	26.7
Costa Rica	30.3
Bolivia	30.6
Nicaragua	31.7
Ecuador	33.3
Paraguay	34.7
Mexico	35.1
Venezuela	40.1
El Salvador	43.3
Dominican Republic	59.1

Source: Clark, Grynspan and Muñoz (2013)

25. High rates of crime-related victimization are also strongly associated with decisions by households to migrate. Personal experiences with corruption also significantly increase the probability that an individual will consider leaving their country.
26. There is an exceedingly high rate of impunity associated with homicide in Latin America. Roughly 80% of European homicides are "solved". In Latin America, the proportion drops to around 50%, and even as low as 8% in some countries.


Persons suspected and convicted per 100,000 homicides by region (2011 or latest year)

Region	Suspected	Convicted
Americas (14 countries)	52	24
Asia (13 countries)	155	48
Europe (30 countries)	100	81
Global (60 countries)	95	44

Source: UNODC (2013, page 93)

27. The regional costs of criminal violence between 2010-2014 averaged about 3.5% of GDP, double that of more developed regions around the world. There is quite a spread across countries ranging from 1.92% (Mexico) to 6.51% (Honduras) of GDP.

Crime-related Costs (Upper Bound) as a Percentage of GDP in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2014




Source: Jaitman, L (2017)

- 28. Criminal violence generates a massive economic cost to society. The total estimated financial burden of criminal violence is between \$114.5 and \$170.4 billion a year, or \$300 per capita.
- 29. There is a strong protective effect of real GDP growth rates on homicide. A 1% increase in the GDP growth rate is correlated with 0.24% fewer homicides per 100,000.
- 30. Youth unemployment is consistently correlated with increases in homicidal violence: a 1% increase in youth unemployment is connected to a 0.34% increase in homicides per 100,000 people.
- 31. There is also a strong relationship between teenage pregnancy – especially among teens in situations of concentrated disadvantage – and national homicide rates. An increase in the contemporaneous teen pregnancy rate is associated with a 0.5% increase in the per 100,000 homicide rate.
- 32. Approaches to public security have oscillated between tough on crime and more preventive approaches, with citizen security gaining ground over the past two decades.
- 33. The first documented citizen security program was in Colombia – Cali, Bogota and Medellin – in 1998. The first initiative to adopt an epidemiological approach to violence prevention in the region was the DESEPAZ intervention in Cali.
- 34. Spending on citizen security has grown over the past 25 years, amounting to at least \$6-7 billion in total from 1998 to the present. Multilateral and bilateral donors account for more than 70% of all investment.

35. Among multilateral investors to Latin America, the Inter-American Development Bank has been the principal investor over the past two decades. Other key partners include CAF, the World Bank, UNDP, UNODC and the OAS.


Citizen security interventions in Latin America by funding source



Source: Igarapé Institute. Citizen Security Dashboard.

36. Year on year bilateral investment in citizen security peaked in 2009 and declined over the past half-decade due to Latin America’s “middle income status”, though the US, Spain, German, the EU and Canada remain active.


\$ millions spent on citizen security interventions in LAC



Source: Igarapé Institute. Citizen Security Dashboard.

- 37. Although the US has increasingly adopted citizen security priorities in its aid programs, it is still primarily devoted to conventional counter-narcotics and anti-gang programs.
- 38. The US committed more than \$10 billion toward countries such as Mexico, Central America, Colombia and the Andean region from 2000 to the present – including Plan Colombia, the Merida Initiative, CARSI and CSBI.
- 39. There are at least 1,300 documented citizen security programs and projects undertaken in Latin America since the late 1990s. There is a heavy concentration of citizen security measures in Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and Nicaragua.


Citizen security interventions in Latin America by country



Source: Igarapé Institute. Citizen Security Dashboard.

- 40. Roughly 50% of all citizen security measures are national programs, while the rest are state- and city-level, or regional activities.


Citizen security interventions in Latin America by catchment



Source: Igarapé Institute. Citizen Security Dashboard.

41. More than 50% of all registered citizen security measures are focused on addressing common crime, while the others focus on juvenile crime and sexual violence reduction.


Citizen security interventions in Latin America by country



Source: Igarapé Institute. Citizen Security Dashboard.

42. Very few citizen security initiatives have been assessed – an estimated 7% of all documented interventions have been subjected to a scientific impact evaluation.

Availability of evaluations and reports of results for a sample of citizen security interventions



Source: Igarapé Institute – Database of citizen security interventions
 Note: this graph is based in a sample of 23% of interventions

43. Some of the most effective interventions have been pursued in Colombia: in Cali (1993-94) and Bogota (1995-97) enforced ban on carrying firearms on weekends, paydays and holidays reduced violence in both cities by almost 15%.

44. A succession of comprehensive social urban and citizen security measures in Medellín helped drop the homicide rate from 266 per 100,000 in 1991 to 30 per 100,000 by 2015.

Homicide rate (per 100,000) Medellín, 1990-2016




Source: National Police of Colombia

45. Also in Colombia, Plan Cuadrantes which supported problem-oriented and community policing resulted in an 18% drop in homicide, a 11% decline in assault and a 22% decline in car thefts where applied.

46. In Brazil, comprehensive citizen security programs generated returns – including in Sao Paulo (homicide rates declined by 70% from the late 1990s to 2010), Rio de Janeiro (homicide declined by 65% from 2009-2013), and also Belo Horizonte and Recife.


International homicide in Rio de Janeiro - Capital and State (per 100,000) 1991-2016



Source: Dados Abertos do Instituto de Segurança Pública Rio de Janeiro

47. In Mexico, Todos Somos Juárez – a comprehensive citizen security program contributed to a 70% drop in homicide from a high of 273 per 100,000 in 2010 to 42 per 100,000 by 2014.

Homicide rate (per 100,000) Ciudad Juárez, 1990-2016



Source: INEGI Defunciones por homicidios

48. Generating reliable comparative data on criminal violence and citizen security outcomes is challenging due to a lack of common standards and capacity.

49. Crime is also heavily under-reported in Latin America because citizens have low confidence in the police. On average roughly 30% of Latin Americans express trust in their police.

50. A regional effort – the standard regional system for citizen security and violence prevention (SES) tracks 22 indicators and now includes over 20 countries. It was supported by IADB and the Cisalva Institute.

Introduction

Most Latin American countries, states and cities are facing a public security crisis. There are signs across Mexico, Central and South America of rising homicide, victimization and restricted freedom of movement and association. The high prevalence of criminal violence is depleting physical and human capital accumulation and undermining economic progress – especially in the poorest segments of society. There are few more urgent priorities than restoring and strengthening the security and safety of citizens across the region.

Latin America features among the world’s most prolific and concentrated forms of criminal violence. Home to just 8% of the world’s population, Latin America experiences at least 33% of the world’s homicidal violence.¹ In 2016, 17 of the 20 most homicidal countries and 47 of the 50 most homicidal cities on the planet were located in the region.² Although the region is still the world’s most murderous in 2017, with a big participation of countries in the top countries, some of the most violent countries saw improvement -including El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala.³ Over the past decade, the annual increase in homicide was 3.7%, three times the population growth rate of 1.15%. There are indications that the situation is worsening: the regional homicide rate is expected to increase from 21.7 murders per 100,000 in 2012 to 35 per 100,000 by 2030.⁴

Latin American governments, businesses and civil society have responded in a variety of ways to criminal violence. Since at least the 1970s and 1980s, the conventional approach to “combating” crime consisted of repressive police deployments, tougher penalties on offenders and the construction of more prisons. There was overwhelming support for governments to get “tough on crime”. Yet in spite of years of efforts and broad social and economic improvements, crime has worsened and prison populations ballooned. In recent years, some governments elected to double down on so-called “mano dura” approaches. Others pursued entirely different strategies.

Starting in the late 1990s and 2000s, so-called “citizen security” and “citizen co-existence” measures emerged that deviated from the standard law and order package. They were frequently designed and developed by municipal leaders in partnership with private actors and academics, and differed fundamentally from past efforts. While there is no fixed definition of citizen security, it is today interpreted as policies and programs that prioritize safety, security and the rights of residents within a framework of state responsibility and citizen engagement. The idea caught on with many Latin American governments and non-governmental organizations now featuring citizen security units, policies, programs and projects.⁵

Very practically, citizen security typically consists of integrated interventions that span the security, justice, prevention and governance sectors. They include, inter alia, reforms to policing strategies, criminal justice procedures, alternatives to incarceration, primary, secondary and tertiary violence prevention measures, strategic management and data collection/analysis improvements and more. There are literally thousands of citizen security programs and projects that have launched since the 1990s littered across Latin America, though still too few that have been properly evaluated.⁶

1 See Clark, Grynspan, and Muñoz (2013), Ortega and Sanguinetti (2014), Chioda (2017), and Jaitman (2015).

2 The Economist (2016).

3 See Americas Quarterly (2018).

4 See Vilalta (2015).

5 Muggah and Szabo (2014).

6 Muggah and Aguirre (2014).

This report provides a general overview of citizen security in Latin America. It first considers the theory and practice of the concept, as well as its evolution and spread across Latin America. Section two then examines the methods and underlying theories of measuring threats to citizen security – specifically criminal violence. Section three highlights the scope, scale, distribution and characteristics of specific types of criminal violence – including homicide, robbery, and victimization. The fourth section considers several attributed causes of criminal violence. The final section explores citizen security principles and strategies.

Section I. Citizen security theory and practice

While widely debated and practiced, there is no formal definition of citizen security. It is frequently referred to as the design, delivery and evaluation of effective public security, justice and penal measures in the context of broader democratic norms. In practical terms, it includes a range of ideas and practices designed to prevent and reduce violence, promote public security and access to justice, strengthen social cohesion and reinforce the mutual rights and obligations of states and citizens. It is distinct from and broader than national “law and order” approaches to policing and controlling crime.

The citizen security construct is widely used by policy makers across Latin America and the Caribbean but it is under-theorised by scholars. At its core, citizen security emphasizes *the responsible state* and *active citizenship*. The concept emerged as a reaction against repressive policing, punitive justice, and tough incarceration measures that were (and are) all too common across the region. It flourished during the 1990s and 2000s as democracy consolidated across Latin America and the Caribbean.

Although not easily defined, it is a surprisingly resilient concept and regularly used by national, state and municipal governments, bilateral and multilateral donors and a wide range of specialist communities across the region (but not outside of Latin America and the Caribbean).⁷ There is a growing acceptance that effective and efficient public safety and security frameworks are those that guarantee the rights of citizens while also reducing real and perceived violence.⁸ There is evidence that smarter policing, strategic investments in prevention, and the bolstering of social co-existence in violence-prone communities are cost-effective.⁹

⁷ Muggah and Szabo (2014).

⁸ See Clark, Grynspan and Muñoz (2013) and Igarapé Institute, *Citizen Security Dashboard*.

⁹ See Abt and Winship (2016) and Ortega and Sanguinetti (2014).

Evolution of citizen security

Latin America and the Caribbean states and cities are among the most violent and insecure on earth. The regional homicide rate is more than three times the global average¹⁰ and citizens there register a heightened sense of insecurity.¹¹ At least 17 of the top 20 most violent countries in the world – measured by homicide rates – are Central American or Caribbean.¹² A staggering one in four people murdered each year is a Brazilian, Colombian, Mexican or Venezuelan.

During the 1980s and 1990s national, state and city government strategies to combat organised crime and youth violence tended to favour police repression and stiff penalties, known colloquially as *mano dura*. Many strategies adopted in the region were supplemented with counter-narcotics and anti-gang support from the US. A basic expectation was that more assertive law enforcement and longer sentences would deter actual and would-be drug traffickers and gangsters. Police violence also began increasing as did the prison populations, including that of non-violent and first-time offenders involved in drug-related crimes.

Starting in the late 1990s and 2000s, there was a growing criticism of narrow punitive criminal justice approaches to crime prevention in Latin America and the Caribbean. This coincided with mounting evidence that policing, criminal justice and penal systems were poorly managed and underprepared and that a more people-centered strategy was urgently required. Enlightened mayors, business people and civic leaders began investing in interventions at the municipal scale, building safety and security from the ground up.

Across Latin America and the Caribbean, and especially in Colombia and Uruguay, leaders began re-imagining public security and justice. It was not just about reforming law enforcement, justice and penal strategies, but also bolstering civic identity and social co-existence, social cohesion and collective efficacy.¹³ Beginning in the late 1990s, a small group of Latin American and Caribbean governments, multilateral and bilateral donors and non-governmental organizations and private groups initiated a wave of innovative citizen security initiatives.¹⁴

Notwithstanding the growing interest in citizen security, over the past few decades the bulk of overseas security assistance and national spending on stability has been devoted toward countering drug production and trafficking and organized crime. The US alone committed more than \$10 billion toward countries such as Mexico, Central America, Colombia and the Andean region from 2000 to the present – including via Plan Colombia, the Merida Initiative, CARSI and CSBI.¹⁵ Spending has declined and the US increasingly referred to its programs as bolstering citizen security.¹⁶

10 See UNODC (2016) and Igarapé Institute, *Homicide Monitor*. See also The Economist (2016 and 2017) for a review of city homicide rates.

11 See, for example, Corporación Latonobarómetro (2016) that regularly surveys popular perceptions of crime and victimization in Latin America. Likewise, the Latinbarómetro has also undertaken similar assessments since the mid-1990s. See also Basombrio (2011).

12 These are, in order, El Salvador (91.2), Trinidad and Tobago (62.7), Honduras (58.9), Venezuela (58), Saint Kitts and Nevis (55.6), US Virgin Islands (52.8), Jamaica (50.7), Belize (39), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (34.7), Bahamas (34.1), Anguilla (27.7), Brazil (27.5), Guatemala (27.3), Colombia (21.9), Puerto Rico (20.6), Montserrat (20.4), Guyana (19.4) -all values by 2016 or latest year available. See Igarapé Institute, *Homicide Monitor*.

13 Dammert (2010).

14 See Alvarado, Muggah, and Aguirre (2015).

15 See Muggah and Szabo (2014).

16 See USAID (2017).

Overall spending on citizen security ranges between \$6-7 billion from 1998 to the present.¹⁷ Bilateral investments have declined in recent years, particularly as Latin American countries shifted from low- to medium-income status. There are few bilateral donors – Spain, Germany, Canada, Norway, the US and the EU – that continue supporting aspects of citizen security. The key investors are the Inter-American Development Bank, though its profile has adapted in recent years to include citizen security and governance together.¹⁸ Other key partners include the World Bank¹⁹, CAF, UNDP²⁰, UNODC²¹, and the OAS.²² Multilateral development agencies have played a highly important role in the prevention and reduction of the violence in Latin America, particularly in the shift from a “public security” approach focused on maintaining public order to a “citizen security” one of prevention and strengthening institutions.²³

There are signs of some Latin American countries charting a new course in terms of international cooperation on citizen security. This includes a debate over reform of drug policy and efforts focused on harm reduction, decriminalization, and in some cases, regulation. Likewise, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico are exploring ways to also share experiences in citizen security using “south-south cooperation” and “technical assistance” modalities. Most cooperation between Latin American countries continues to consist of the transfer of skills and know-how rather than the provision of grants or loans.

Section II. Measuring crime and violence

A real challenge in Latin America is ensuring standardized and reliable statistics on crime and victimization. While the region has achieved significant gains in recent years, there are many challenges. There are many sources of data for assessing the incidence and characteristics of criminal violence including crime records, health statistics and victimization surveys. But generating comparable data is exceedingly challenging at the national scale. As a result, there is a growing tendency to focus on sub-national and even micro-level data to better understand the patterns of crime in cities and neighborhoods.

There are considerable weaknesses with the coverage and quality of policing, justice, prison and violence-related administrative data in Latin America. This is because different countries – and their respective national statistical offices (NSOs) – often exhibit different standards and capacities in collecting basic information. In order to address these challenges, the IADB, the CISALV Institute of the Universidad de Valle launched a standardized regional system of 22 indicators for citizen security and violence prevention (SES) for 20 countries in 2007.²⁴ The goal is to help improve statistics collection and analysis of the national statistics offices and research groups.²⁵

Even where data collection capabilities are comparatively advanced, there is frequently a discrepancy between objectively reported crime and perceptions of victimization in Latin America.

17 See Muggah and Szabo (2014).

18 See IDB, *Citizen Security and Justice*.

19 See Reddy (2011).

20 See IDB, *Citizen Security and Justice*.

21 See UNODC, *Improving Citizen Security in Panama*.

22 See OAS. *OAS Observatory on Citizen Security*.

23 Aguirre and Muggah (2017).

24 According to SES, 12 of the indicators (e.g. homicide, violent assault, kidnapping, etc) are based on administrative data while the other 10 (e.g. domestic violence, rape, and perceptions of insecurity, etc) are based on surveys. See Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), *High Stakes Numbers Game. Regional System of Standardized Indicators in Citizen Security*. (2008).

25 The UNODC and others have developed a range of standards for classifying various categories of crime. See, for example, UNODC (2016) and Bogotá Protocol (2015).

Many types of crime are widely under-reported in Latin America because citizens simply do not trust the police. Yet victimization surveys consistently demonstrate a much higher rate of crime than is reported by national statistics offices. For example, in Peru – the official incidence of robbery is 217 events per 100,000 or 64,000 incidents. Victimization surveys suggest that 23% of Peruvians were robbed or 6.8 million potential incidents.²⁶ These gaps between administrative data and reported victimization are consistent across virtually all countries of Latin America.

Theories of crime and violence

Notwithstanding the variations in reporting, there are a number of common characteristics related to crime and victimization in Latin America. For one, crime tends to concentrate in place, time and among specific people.²⁷ Not only is criminal violence especially concentrated in specific sub-regions – it is also hyper-clustered in specific cities, neighborhoods and households. Researchers often refer to this phenomenon as hot places and hot people.

The first reason crime concentrates has to do with the characteristics of the places in which it occurs. A particular setting's social organization and collective efficacy provide one explanation for why more crime occurs in some areas as opposed to others. If the social ties within a community are too weak to influence how local people behave, criminality, in particular juvenile crime, is more likely. Likewise, where there is concentrated poverty and inequality, high levels of youth unemployment, and a high turnover of residents, violent crime also becomes more likely.

The second reason why crime concentrates is due to the specific behaviors of people – namely perpetrators and victims. In order for a crime to be committed there must be a motivated offender, a suitable target, and the absence of someone who might intervene. Crime, then, comes down to the routine activities of people. Would-be perpetrators regularly consider the risks and rewards for committing a specific crime, and the opportunities are not equally distributed across space.

Third, crime pattern theory contends that offenders are more likely to carry out acts closer to home and in areas that are familiar. The aggregation of these criminal activities provides a micro-level explanation of why crime concentrates – criminal activities are constrained to the non-random distribution of targets, to places, people, and times when risks are lower, to places that are more familiar, and where and when crime opportunities are more present than others.

Most studies mapping out the characteristics of violent and property-related crime are drawn from western industrialized countries. While these environments are clearly distinct from those in Latin America, the broad theoretical principles of social disorganization, routine activity and crime pattern theory likely apply. Even so, there is still considerable variation when it comes to reporting crime events and in relation to criminal justice capacities. What is more, lethal violence tends to be more erratic than other forms of non-violent crime that often exhibit more predictable peaks and troughs.

Even so, Latin American researchers are making progress in assessing the properties of homicidal violence. A meta-review identified 68 peer-review studies that assessed the spatial,

²⁶ See Clark, Grynspan, and Muñoz (2013).

²⁷ See Muggah, Aguirre and Chainey (2017). See also Vilalta, Castillo and Torres (2016).

demographic and temporal patterns of murder in Latin American cities.²⁸ While policy makers have been relatively slow to pick-up on the findings from this work, there is clearly growing awareness among law enforcement representatives of the value of mobilizing data to prevent and reduce homicide in Latin America.

Section III. Prevalence of crime and victimization

Publicly available data indicates that Latin America exhibits the highest homicide rates in the world. The region has just 8% of the world's population, but 33% of its murders. The regional homicide rate is 21.5 per 100,000, as compared to a global murder rate of roughly 7 per 100,000. The sheer dimensions of homicidal violence are breath-taking. In 2015, an estimated 154,000 Latin Americans were intentionally murdered. Between 2000-2016, an estimated 2,500,000 were victims of homicide. This is likely an under-count given the high levels of disappearances and low clearance rates of criminal violence across the region.

Figure 3.1 Distribution of homicide (total) and populations in Latin America and global (2015)

	Homicide (total)	Population
Latin America and the Caribbean	145,895	588,000,000
World	437,000	7,125,000,000
Percentage	33	8

Source: Igarapé Institute, *Homicide Monitor*.

The scale of Latin American homicides has increased over the past decades. Indeed, there has been a 12% increase in homicide rates between 2000-2015. These increases occurred while homicide rates stabilized or dropped by more than 50% in virtually all other parts of the world.²⁹ Many observers have characterized homicide levels in countries such as Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, some Caribbean countries and Venezuela as epidemic, and even exceeding war-time levels (which are defined by WHO as 30 per 100,000).

Figure 3.2 Homicide rates per 100,000 over time per region (2000-2015)

Region	2000-03	2004-07	2008-11	2012-15
Africa	13.81	7.34	6.10	10.38
Asia	4.21	4.49	3.11	2.98
Europe	2.58	2.34	2.26	2.38
Oceania	3.99	3.86	3.31	1.75
The Americas	14.76	17.69	20.84	21.70
Global average	7.95	8.26	7.94	11.30

Source: Igarapé Institute, *Homicide Monitor*.

²⁸ See Muggah, Aguirre and Chainey (2017).

²⁹ See Clark, Grynspar, and Muñoz (2013).

Figure 3.3 Projecting homicide rates per 100,000 per region (2000-2030)

	Latin America	Africa	Asia	Europe	Oceania	Global
2000	15.2	19.1	4.7	2.7	2.8	8.6
2005	18.1	6.4	4.8	2.6	4.4	8.5
2010	22.4	7.2	3.4	2.3	4.5	8.5
2015*	23.7	8.8	2.8	1.7	1.8	6.3
2020*	27.1	7.2	2.5	1.5	2.0	5.7
2025*	30.5	5.6	2.1	1.2	2.1	5.1
2030*	34.0	4.0	1.7	1.0	2.3	4.5

Source: *Homicide Monitor* and Vilalta (2015). Values with * are projected

There is considerable heterogeneity in violent crime across the region. There is a high degree of variation in homicide between and within Latin American countries. For example, just four countries – Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela – account for one in four homicides globally. These four countries generated over 114,000 murders in 2012 as compared to 437,000 globally.


Figure 3.4 The concentration of homicide in selected Latin American countries

	Proportion of global homicides	Total number of homicides in 2016 or latest year
Brazil	13%	56,337
Mexico	6%	25,967
Venezuela	4%	16,072
Colombia	4%	15,733
Rest of the world	74%	322,891
World	74%	437,000
LAC 4 countries	26%	114,109

Source: Igarapé Institute, *Homicide Monitor*.

There are also considerable concentrations of homicide violence within countries. For example, in Mexico there are some states and cities reporting homicide rates above 200 per 100,000 and others with rates below 2 per 100,000. Likewise, in Chile, there are regions with almost 3 homicides per 100,000 and others with roughly 0.5 per 100,000. This variance is important to recognize when designing regional, national and subnational strategies.

Figure 3.5 Country-level homicide rates in Central and South America per 100,000 (2000-2017)



Source: Igarapé Institute, Homicide Monitor.

Figure 3.6 Homicide rates and counts in The Americas, latest year available, sorted by highest homicide rate

Rank	Country	Homicide rate (per 100,000)	Absolute number of homicides	Year
1	El Salvador	60.0	3,954	2017
2	Jamaica	56.0	1,616	2017
3	Venezuela	53.7	16,046	2017
4	Honduras	42.8	3,791	2017
5	Saint Kitts and Nevis	42.0	23	2017
6	Belize	37.2	142	2017
7	Trinidad and Tobago	36.0	494	2017
8	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	35.5	39	2016
9	Saint Lucia	34.0	57	2017
10	Bahamas	31.0	123	2017
11	Brazil	27.8	57,395	2016
12	Guatemala	26.0	4,410	2017

Rank	Country	Homicide rate (per 100,000)	Absolute number of homicides	Year
13	Antigua and Barbuda	25.0	20	2017
14	Colombia	22.0	10,200	2017
15	Mexico	20.4	25,339	2017
16	Puerto Rico	19.4	669	2017
17	Dominica	16.7	12	2013
18	Dominican Republic	16.0	1,616	2015
19	Guyana	15.0	116	2017
20	Costa Rica	12.1	602	2017
21	Barbados	11.0	31	2017
22	Panamá	10.1	421	2016
23	Haiti	10.0	1,056	2015
24	Paraguay	9.4	669	2016
25	Peru	7.7	2,435	2016
26	Uruguay	7.6	265	2016
27	Grenada	7.5	8	2014
28	Nicaragua	6.8	436	2017
29	Bolivia	6.4	698	2016
30	Argentina	6.0	2,605	2016
31	Suriname	6.0	35	2017
32	Ecuador	5.7	941	2016
33	Cuba	5.4	609	2015
34	United States of America	5.3	17,250	2016
35	Chile	2.7	495	2016
36	Canada	1.7	611	2016

Source: Igarapé Institute, *Homicide Monitor*.

The demographics of homicide victims share common characteristics across virtually all Latin American countries. Approximately 90% of all Latin American murder victims are male as compared to a global average of 74%. Where overall levels of violence are high, the proportion of males involved as victims tend to also rise higher. Meanwhile, just 1 in 10 homicide victims are female, though there are reports of increasing femicide in some countries such as Chile (19%) and Peru (16%).

Figure 3.7 Homicide rates (per 100,000) by gender (2015 or latest year)

Country	Female	Male	Overall national	Ratio male/female
El Salvador	16.99	202.99	115.9	12
Honduras	12.01	125.77	68	10
Guatemala	7.60	50.49	60	7
Colombia	4.80	48.62	26	10
Brazil	4.68	52.28	28	11
Mexico	4.19	31.91	16	8
Uruguay	2.80	12.69	8	5
Cuba	2.62	9.43	6	4
Costa Rica	2.28	23.88	10	10
Peru	2.22	11.10	6.7	5
Panama	2.18	31.72	16	15
Ecuador	1.87	12.05	7	6
Nicaragua	1.75	13.12	8	7
United States	1.64	5.84	4.5	4
Paraguay	1.54	16.00	8	10
Argentina	1.48	8.76	5.2	6
Chile	1.21	5.13	2.8	4

Source: Igarapé Institute, *Homicide Monitor*.

Homicide rates are especially concentrated among the youth population. Latin America's youth homicide rate is more than three times the rate of the general population – reaching 70 per 100,000. Indeed, 46% of all homicide victims in Latin America are between 15 and 29 years old. The proportion of young people that are victims of homicide is highest in Brazil (54% of all victims), El Salvador (52%), Honduras (51%) and Colombia (51%). The next most affected age group are males between 30-45. Young working-age males are also among the most productive group in the population, which also contributes to the high economic burden and future capital formation.


Figure 3.8 Proportion of homicide by sex, by sub-regions. Average 2000-16

Sub-region	Female	Male	Sub-region	Female	Male
South America	12%	88%	Global	25%	74%
The Caribbean	15%	83%	South-Eastern Asia	27%	74%
Northern Africa	18%	82%	Southern Asia	27%	73%
Central Asia	19%	81%	Western Africa	30%	70%
Eastern Asia & Pacific	20%	81%	Eastern Europe	31%	69%
Middle Africa	20%	80%	Northern Europe	31%	69%
Central America	20%	80%	Southern Europe	28%	65%
Western Asia	22%	78%	Western Europe	38%	63%
Southern Africa	22%	78%	Eastern Asia	38%	62%
Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia	28%	75%	Australia and New Zealand	40%	60%
Eastern Africa	26%	74%	North America	13%	37%

Source: Igarapé Institute, *Homicide Monitor*.


The proportion of homicides involving firearms is astonishingly high in Latin America. Globally, roughly 32% of all homicides are committed with a firearm (2000-2016). The proportion is twice as high in Central America (78%) and considerable higher in South America (53%) and the Caribbean (51%). In some countries and cities, the distribution can rise above 80% as in Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico and Venezuela. There is also a relationship between countries with high proportions of gun-related homicides and high rates of murder.

Figure 3.9 Scatter plot of proportion of homicides by firearm vs. homicide rates. All countries by region, 2000-2016



Source: Igarapé Institute, *Homicide Monitor*.

Figure 3.10 Proportion of homicides by instrument per sub-region (average 2000-2016)



Source: Igarapé Institute, *Homicide Monitor*.

Figure 3.11 Mapping the most homicidal cities (top 50, latest year)

Ranking	City	Country	Rate	Number	Year
1	San Salvador	El Salvador	136.7	432	2016
2	Acapulco de Juarez	Mexico	108.1	918	2016
3	San Pedro Sula	Honduras	104.3	807	2016
4	Soyapango	El Salvador	91.1	220	2016
5	Chilpancingo de los Bravo (Guerrero)	Mexico	88.1	994	2016
6	Distrito Central	Honduras	79.9	994	2016
7	Marabá	Brazil	76.7	207	2015
8	Grande Sao Luís	Brazil	74.5	868	2015
9	Guatemala	Guatemala	70.8	704	2016
10	Ananindeua	Brazil	69.6	616	2015
11	Choloma	Honduras	65.5	231	2016
12	Serra	Brazil	64.7	353	2015
13	Caruaru	Brazil	64.0	235	2015

Ranking	City	Country	Rate	Number	Year
14	Viamão	Brazil	61.9	138	2015
15	Cape Town	South Africa	61.5	2,469	2016
16	Belém	Brazil	60.9	710	2015
17	Victoria	Mexico	60.5	216	2016
18	Mossoró	Brazil	59.3	181	2015
19	St. Louis	US	59.3	188	2016
20	Aparecida de Goainia	Brazil	58.8	299	2015
21	Caucaia	Brazil	58.8	164	2015
22	Aracaju	Brazil	58.5	458	2015
23	Santa Ana	El Salvador	55.4	136	2016
24	Imperatriz	Brazil	54.5	169	2015
25	Manaus	Brazil	54.3	1,123	2015
26	Cali	Colombia	53.2	1,273	2016
27	Nelson Mandela Bay	South Africa	53.1	668	2016
28	Camacari	Brazil	53.0	168	2015
29	Baltimore	US	52.1	318	2016
30	Maceió	Brazil	51.8	655	2015
31	Betim	Brazil	51.5	228	2015
32	Cariacica	Brazil	51.1	169	2015
33	Natal	Brazil	50.9	470	2015
34	Villa Nueva	Guatemala	50.7	292	2016
35	Tijuana	Mexico	49.8	871	2016
36	Vitória da Conquista	Brazil	49.5	170	2015
37	Juazeiro do Norte	Brazil	47.4	142	2015
38	Buffalo City	South Africa	46.5	388	2016
39	Palmira	Colombia	46.3	142	2016
40	Culiacán	Mexico	46.3	439	2016
41	Mazatlán	Mexico	46.3	224	2016
42	Porto Alegre	Brazil	46.0	746	2015
43	Canoas	Brazil	45.4	164	2015
44	Detroit	US	44.9	303	2016
45	New Orleans	US	44.5	174	2006
46	Cuiabá	Brazil	43.8	268	2015
47	Joao Pessoa	Brazil	43.7	518	2015
48	San Juan (City in Puerto Rico)	Puerto Rico	43.4	155	2016
49	Kingston (city in Jamaica)	Jamaica	43.2	158	2016
50	Jaboatão dos Guararapes	Brazil	42.4	291	2015


Source: Igarapé Institute, *Homicide Monitor*.

Latin America is not just a global leader in homicide, but in several forms of violent crime in the world such as physical assault and robbery. There is a particularly high level of reported crime – especially property-related and interpersonal incidents – in the Caribbean and Central America. Violent crime – committed with both firearms and bladed weapons – are also disproportionately common (see Annex).

Latin Americans are extremely preoccupied with violent robbery. Surveys suggest that one in five Latin Americans experienced some form of violent or non-violent robbery in the past year.³⁰ Such crimes are routinely ranked by Latin Americans as their number one security concern, above organized crime and gang-related violence. In contrast to other regions that have experienced steady declines in robbery, Latin America has registered a 25-year increase in all forms of robbery.

Surveys conducted by LAPOP³¹ track the level of revealed victimization. They consider the types of crime reported by victims over the previous 12 months. They are by definition subjective, and tend to report higher levels of criminality than is reported to the police. Surveys conducted in 2014 reveal exceedingly high levels of victimization in Latin America: 15% of all respondents reported being a victim of crime. The proportion ranges from 25% of respondents in Peru and Ecuador to 10% of all respondents in Guyana, Jamaica and Panama.

Figure 3.12 Victim of Crime in the previous 12 months (Percentage) 2014



Source: Vanderbilt University, Latin American Public Opinion Project

30 See Vanderbilt University, *LAPOP Survey Data*.

31 See Vanderbilt University, *Latin American Public Opinion Project*.

Almost half of all respondents to LAPOP surveys indicated being victims of robbery (both armed and unarmed). The countries reporting the highest percentage of armed robbery were Venezuela, Honduras and El Salvador. Countries that commonly reported as less violent report the highest proportions of unarmed robbery, including Bolivia, Chile and Panama. LAPOP surveys also highlights the high proportion of rape and sexual assault in Caribbean countries such as Haiti and Barbados, and extortion in Mexico and El Salvador.


Figure 3.13 Victim of Crime in the previous 12 months (Percentage)

Country	Low	Average	High
Venezuela	45%	40%	15%
Dominican Republic	45%	41%	14%
Guyana	43%	44%	13%
Belize	41%	42%	17%
Paraguay	38%	44%	19%
Mexico	37%	50%	13%
Jamaica	37%	50%	13%
Guatemala	36%	51%	13%
Peru	36%	53%	11%
Bolivia	33%	59%	8%
Trinidad and Tobago	33%	54%	14%
Brazil	31%	47%	22%
Honduras	28%	51%	21%
Argentina	28%	54%	18%
AVERAGE	26%	51%	23%
Colombia	25%	54%	21%
Costa Rica	25%	57%	19%
El Salvador	23%	52%	25%
Barbados	22%	56%	22%
Nicaragua	20%	44%	36%
Uruguay	20%	54%	27%
USA	17%	58%	25%
Bahamas	15%	48%	37%
Haiti	15%	55%	30%
Ecuador	15%	55%	31%
Panama	14%	60%	26%
Chile	10%	46%	44%
Suriname	10%	50%	40%
Canada	8%	49%	43%

Source: Vanderbilt University, *Latin American Public Opinion Project*.

There is also a pervasive sense of neighborhood insecurity among Latin Americans. According to LAPOP surveys, 34% of Latin American residents perceive their neighborhood to be insecure. There are inevitably large variations across individual countries and cities. The countries where respondents reported the highest levels of victimization included Venezuela (49%), Mexico (46%) and Argentina (41%). Those countries registering the lowest reported victimization include Ecuador (29%), Bolivia (30%) and Nicaragua (31%). There is frequently a disjuncture between “reported” crime and “perceptions” as noted above.

Figure 3.14 Perception of insecurity in the neighborhood.



Source: Vanderbilt University, Latin American Public Opinion Project/ 2014

There is a high concentration of young people involved as perpetrators of homicide and other forms of criminal violence. The profile for victims of homicide is similar to perpetrators – young and unemployed. There is a hyper-concentration among 18-25 year old males³², with a considerable number of young people inhabiting Latin America’s famously violent and over-crowded prisons.

Cartel and gang-related violence is a significant contributor to high violence rates in Latin America. According to the UN, homicidal violence perpetrated by gangs accounts for 26% of all lethal violence in the Americas (57% of its known causes). By way of contrast, in Asia and Europe, intimate partner and family-related violence accounts for a much higher share of homicide – 28% in Asia (46% of known causes) and 27% in Europe (73% of known causes).

Figure 3.15 Disaggregating motivations for criminal violence in the Americas (2011)

	Americas (n: 11 countries)	Asia (n: 6 countries)	Europe (n: 9 countries)
Gangs and organized crime	26	14	6
Robbery and theft	11	18	4
Intimate partner and family	8	28	27
Other	35	31	38
Unknown	21	9	23

Source: Krause, Muggah and Gilgen (2011).

Latin America is facing a major crisis with its penal system. Virtually every country in Latin America is facing a challenge with prison overpopulation, excessive pre-trial detention, and a deterioration in services. Prison violence is explosive – especially in Central America and South America. In Chile, Mexico and Peru, over 75% of surveyed inmates report feeling less safe in prison than where they lived before being incarcerated. There are also major challenges with recidivism.

Latin America is one of the planet’s most urbanized regions. Three of its mega-cities are among the world’s largest – Buenos Aires, Mexico and Sao Paulo. Sprawling metropolises like Bogota, Lima and Rio de Janeiro are not far behind. These cities are complex, competitive and dynamic. Many Latin American cities also suffer from what some scholars refer to as “peripheralization” – they are fragmented, segregated and exclusionary. In a word, they are fragile.

The bulk of Latin America’s urbanization is taking place behind the scenes. In addition to the massive cities and conurbations up and down Latin America’s Atlantic and Pacific coastlines, there are another 310 cities with populations over 250,000 and another 16,000 smaller towns. Today, 82% of the population lives in cities. Already some 93% of Venezuelans, 92.5% of Argentinians and Uruguayans, 90.6% of Brazilians, and 89.3% of Chileans live in cities.

Owing to high rates of urbanization, there is a high level of concentration of criminal violence in Latin American cities. Not surprisingly, there are comparatively high rates of crime in urban and per-urban areas.³³ By 2016, the region was home to 44 of the 50 most murderous cities on earth. Cities in El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico and Guatemala were at the top of the charts. Meanwhile, Brazil featured 27 cities on the list in 2016, most of them clustered along the northern and eastern coast. Not surprisingly, urban dwellers single out insecurity as their over-riding priority.

³² See Ortega and Sanguinetti (2014) (p. 55).

³³ See Muggah and Szabó (2016).

There are some Latin American countries and cities reporting significantly lower than average levels of criminal violence. It is important to underline that countries such as Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru and Nicaragua report low levels of homicide. There are also many cities registering extremely low levels of homicide – 100 times below the regional average (see Annex). Even so, a significant proportion of Latin Americans are concerned about insecurity. Public polling shows that half of all Latin Americans believe that security in their country has deteriorated.³⁴ In the past year, more than 65% of all Latin Americans decided against going out at night because of fears of insecurity and another 13% decided to relocate because of fear of becoming a victim of crime.³⁵

Latin America consistently reports the highest levels of fear and insecurity in the world, according to major perception surveys. Between 2008-2015 Latin America consistently scored as the region where residents felt the least secure in their communities. By contrast, residents of Southeast Asia, North America, East Asia and Europe scored as the most secure. Latin Americans report feeling unsafe in their countries.³⁶ Latin America features five of the ten most unsafe countries for citizens. When asked if they feel safe, just 14% of Venezuelans, 36% of Salvadorans, 36% of Dominicans, 40% of Peruvians and 40% Mexicans responded affirmatively.

According to polling companies, Latin Americans also express exceedingly low confidence in their police forces. Just 19% of Venezuelans reported being confident in the police in 2015 – the lowest score of any country on the planet. By comparison, 32% of Afghans and 32% of Syrians report being confident in their police. These low scores have been confirmed by a range of researchers, including the International Police Science Association, which ranks Venezuela and Mexico at the bottom of its list.³⁷

One of the reasons Latin Americans have a low opinion of their police and justice systems is because of the chronic levels of impunity. There is an exceedingly high rate of impunity associated with homicide (and many other crimes) in Latin America. To put the challenge in perspective, consider that roughly 80% of European homicides are “solved”. In Latin America, the proportion drops to around 50%, and even as low as 8% in some countries.

Figure 3.16 Persons suspected and convicted per 100,000 homicides by region (2011 or latest year)

Region	Suspected	Convicted
Americas (14 countries)	52	24
Asia (13 countries)	155	48
Europe (30 countries)	100	81
Global (60 countries)	95	44

Source: UNCTS (2014).

More positively, there are some Latin American countries demonstrating improvements in the legitimacy of its institutions and citizen confidence. For example, Uruguay and Chile have registered important improvements – ranking 21 and 23 out of 169 countries tracked by transparency groups.³⁸ By contrast, Venezuela is ranked near the bottom at 158th.

³⁴ See Vanderbilt University, *LAPOP Survey Data*.

³⁵ See Clark, Grynspan and Muñoz (2013).

³⁶ See Ray (2016).

³⁷ See IPSA (2016).

³⁸ See Navarez (2016).

Figure 3.17 Ranking of selected Latin American countries by transparency (2016)

Country	Ranking in transparency (out of 169)
Uruguay	21
Chile	23
Costa Rica	37
Cuba	38
El Salvador	42
Panama	42
Brazil	76
Peru	88
Mexico	89
Bolivia	90
Argentina	91
Ecuador	92
Honduras	112
Guatemala	114
Nicaragua	115
Paraguay	115
Venezuela	158

Source: Navarez (2016).

Section IV. Causes of crime and violence

There is a paradox at the center of Latin American’s criminal violence challenge. During the 2000s, there were important improvements – reductions in poverty (more than 80 million people rose above the poverty line from 2003-2012), declines in income inequality (over 14 countries experienced declines in Gini coefficient) and the expansion of the middle class and wider social and economic well-being. Yet at the same time, the prevalence of violence also rose in most countries, with few exceptions.³⁹ This contradiction – rising well-being and rising violence – suggests a high degree of complexity.⁴⁰

A key finding is that the relationship between violent crime and overall development is not linear. According to the World Bank “homicide rates first increase as per capita income rises and then decline at high levels of per capital income”.⁴¹ This is because as income grows, the opportunity costs of crime also increase. There is also likely an increased demand for security and safety as levels of crime rise, forcing more investment in controlling crime.

Another key insight is that investments in social and economic development alone cannot necessarily reduce criminal violence. It turns out that the size of the middle class and levels of poverty are not on their own statistical determinants of violence trends. What seems to matter is the speed of development: a 1% increase in the growth rate of GDP correlates with 0.24 fewer homicides per 100,000. This suggests that the speed of growth is a “protective factor”, reducing the benefits of crime.

³⁹ See Muggah (2015).

⁴⁰ See Chioda (2017) and Muggah (2015).

⁴¹ See Chioda (2017).

The factors shaping crime incidence are of course multi-causal. And while there is no single monolithic cause, several factors stand out. One of them is the relationship between youth unemployment and violent crime. Panel surveys have shown that a 1% increase in youth unemployment leads to an additional 0.34 additional homicides per 100,000 people.⁴² The reason for this is that youth are especially susceptible to predation and criminal behavior, and the benefits of engagement in the criminal market are higher than the formal market. It is important to stress, however, that employment alone may be insufficient to deter involvement in crime. There is research suggesting that the “quality” of labor matters.

Low rates of education achievement are also frequently correlated with higher exposure to criminal violence. Latin America has expanded access to schools and improved literacy rates, but drop-out rates are still high and school quality is low. The non-completion of school – especially secondary education – is strongly correlated with delinquency. Studies from Bogota indicate that age and educational attainment are key factors shaping violent crime exposure, and that targeted support for permanent income can play an important deterrent role in criminal involvement.

There have been demographic changes, including in number of single-headed female households. Number of households headed by single mothers has doubled from 7.3% in 1970 to 15% in 2000. This has resulted in a larger rate of parental absence and abandonment, including lower supervision of children. Without adequate childcare options as well as educational, recreational and social programs, children are more prone to negative peer-influences and high risk behavior. Children that are systematically neglected and exposed to delinquent peer groups are more likely to end up in prisons. Interventions that focus on supporting positive early childhood development, parenting skills, and engagement in social programs (particularly for adolescents) can be cost-effective.

It is often clusters of factors that contribute to rising criminal violence. Certain socio-economic factors significantly influence criminal violence. In Mexico City⁴³, for example, economic inequality and broken families play a strong role, while in Monterrey⁴⁴ youth unemployment, the absence of schools, and the concentration of young males are especially salient. In Ciudad Juarez being a migrant, over 15 years old, living near vacant housing and in areas with limited access to water are all strongly correlated with high homicide rates.⁴⁵ In Medellin, crowded, cluttered and smaller dwellings are especially vulnerable to homicide. Another study from Medellin revealed that a 1% increase in permanent income produces an average 0.4% decrease in the homicide rate.⁴⁶

There are also several factors that while often associated with crime, do not have a strong statistical influence. For example, there is not necessarily a strong empirical relationship between criminal violence and illegal drug consumption. Indeed, there is often a false association between people involved with drugs and their propensity to commit crimes. Rather, there may be a stronger relationship between people involved with growing, producing and selling drugs on the one hand, and the negative consequences and collateral damage of the state’s war on drugs.

There is, however, a strong relationship between alcohol abuse and violent behavior. These relationships are present in neighborhood and household surveys, as well as in prison studies. Surveys in 12 Latin American countries show a heavy involvement of alcohol in cases where women were victims of intimate partner violence. Where restrictions on alcohol consumption were introduced – as in Diadema (Brazil) or Bogota (Colombia) – there were corresponding decreases in violent crime.

42 See Chioda (2017).

43 See Vilalta and Muggah (2016).

44 See Téllez and Medellín (2014).

45 See Vilalta and Muggah (2016).

46 See Urrego, Gómez and Velasquez (2016).

The relative strength of governance and state institutions also plays a role in shaping criminal violence in several Latin American cities. There is some evidence that where law enforcement institutions are overwhelmed - as in a case reported in Sao Paulo - homicide rates can escalate.⁴⁷ By contrast, where police deployments are carefully targeted, as the case of Bogota and Barranquilla shows, homicide rates can be diminished.⁴⁸ Confidence in public institutions – especially the police – is exceedingly low. LAPOP surveys in 2014 indicate that just 16% of Latin American respondents have no confidence in police. In Belize, Guyana and Venezuela, the ratio rises to 30%. The police forces are also consistently ranked as the least valued public institution by young Latin Americans.

Figure 4.1 Confidence in Latin American institutions (2015-2016)

	2015	2016	1995-2016 (average)
Church	69	66	69
Armed forces	44	50	NA
Police	36	38	39
Electoral institutions	44	32	NA
Government	33	28	37
Judicial system	30	26	32
Congress	27	26	31
Political parties	20	17	22

Source: Corporación Latinobarómetro (2016).

Throughout Latin America, public confidence in the criminal justice system is also exceedingly low – with the exception of the Dominican Republic, Panama and Nicaragua, over half of all Latin Americans expressed little to no faith in their court systems. A measure of faith in criminal justice is the extent of reporting of crime. As previously noted, there is a low level of reporting in crime in Latin America. Only a tiny proportion of women involved in sexual violence report the incident to law enforcement.

Partly as a result of this crisis of confidence, Latin Americans are turning increasingly to private institutions – especially private security guards – to shore-up their safety. There is a higher ratio of security guards than police across Latin America: 3.8 million private guards to an estimated 2.6 million police officers. In countries such as Guatemala the ratio is even more extreme – there are 19,900 officers as compared to 120,000 private security guards.

There is a widespread acceptance for punitive approaches to dealing with crime. For example, growing numbers of citizens are calling for the lowering of the age of criminal responsibility. Likewise, vigilantism continues to be a common practice, with over 30% of the population accepting “taking the law into their own hands” in Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic.⁴⁹

47 See Clark and McGrath (2007).

48 See Garza, Nieto, and Gutiérrez (2009).

49 See Vanderbilt University, *Latin American Public Opinion Project*.

Section V. Costs of crime and violence

There is a statistically significant relationship between higher levels of insecurity and lower levels of development. Where levels of violence are higher, there tends to be less economic productivity and growth.⁵⁰ There are also signs that countries and cities exhibiting high rates of inequality and low growth are susceptible to above-average rates of crime.⁵¹ Many Latin Americans also associate various forms of violence with under-development.

Specifically, when asked what kinds of violence are most disruptive to development in their country, 63% of Latin Americans cited intimate partner violence, 60% noted violence against children, 59% mentioned street violence and 51% emphasized organized crime and gangs. By way of contrast, when asked what types of violence were most common, 35% cited street violence, 23% cited armed gangs, 22% noted intimate partner violence and 16% pointed to violence against children.⁵²

There are several ways to measure the economic costs of criminal violence. They can be based on the expenditures devoted to police and private security as well as the attendant social and economic – both welfare and productivity - losses associated with crime and victimization. By every estimate, the costs are exceedingly high in Latin America. Indeed, the share of public expenditures on law enforcement and private security as a function of total spending in Latin America is double that of OECD countries.⁵³

Figure 5.1 Mean crime costs of Latin American in perspective

Country	Percentage of GDP
Germany	1.34
Canada	1.39
Australia	1.76
France	1.87
United Kingdom	2.55
United States	2.75
LAC	3.55

Source: Jaitman et al. (2015).

The economic burden of criminal violence in Latin America is considerable. This can be assessed by examining the costs, expenditures, losses and investments incurred by households, firms and public agencies. The regional costs for 2010-14 average 3.5% of GDP, double that of developed regions. They range from 1.92-6.51% of GDP, though they range from country to country. In some Central American countries, for example, the cost of violence is double the regional average. In Honduras, the costs rise to 6.5% of GDP and in El Salvador 6.16%. By contrast, in some South American countries they are less than half the regional average. Meanwhile, some countries are at the other end, including Mexico (1.92%) and Uruguay (2.23%).⁵⁴

⁵⁰ See Krause, Muggah and Gilgen (2011).

⁵¹ See Krause, Muggah and Gilgen (2011).

⁵² See Corporación Latinobarómetro (2016).

⁵³ See Jaitman et al. (2015).

⁵⁴ See Jaitman (2017).

Figure 5.2 Overall crime-related costs by subregion, 2014 (percent of GDP)

Region	%
Central America	4.2
Caribbean	3.6
Andean Region	3.1
Southern Cone	3.0
LAC Average	3.5

Source: Jaitman (2017).

In monetary terms, the costs of criminal violence run into the hundreds of billions of dollars for the region. The total costs of criminal violence for seventeen countries in the region are estimated at between \$114.5 and \$170.4 billion a year. This translates into roughly \$300 per capita. In Trinidad and Tobago and the Bahamas the costs rise to \$1,189 and \$1,176 per capita respectively). Countries like Argentina, Chile, Brazil and El Salvador are all double the per capita average.⁵⁵ Taken together, the costs of crime in the region are twice the average costs in developed countries.⁵⁶ Central America exhibits the highest costs of crime, followed by the Caribbean.

Investments in citizen security across Latin America appear to be inefficient. A recent study estimates that Latin American governments spent between \$55 and \$70 billion on public security – police, justice and prisons – in 2014, with a much smaller proportion devoted to “citizen security” measures.⁵⁷ Government spending on public security across Latin America is on average a third of the amount spent on health and education⁵⁸, but still between two and three times higher than in developed countries. While spending on health and education is positively correlated with improved outcomes in most Latin American countries, there have not been similar gains in public security and safety. Countries with equivalent levels of expenditure on public security may have radically divergent security outcomes.

There is steadily increasing expenditure on prisons in Latin America. These costs are due to both public spending on prison administration and foregone income of inmate population. Prison costs are rising because of the expansion of mass incarceration across the region: the prison population rose from 101.2 inmates per 100,000 in 1995 to 218.5 per 100,000 by 2012 – an increase of 116%.⁵⁹ Over the same period expenditures on prisons increased from \$4.3 billion in 2010 to \$7.8 billion in 2014. Meanwhile the costs of incarceration also increased from roughly \$5.8 billion in 2010 to more than \$8.4 billion in 2014 – a 45% increase. Taken together, the overall losses are on average \$13.8 billion a year to the region, or 0.39% of GDP.⁶⁰

55 See Jaitman et al. (2015).

56 Specific clusters of countries are driving the high costs in each sub-region. In Central America, the high expenditures on private security is shaped by El Salvador and Honduras. In the Andean region Colombia is the key driver, while in South America, it is Brazil and Venezuela that are driving up expenditures. See Jaitman et al. (2015).

57 Ibid.

58 See Jaitman et al. (2015).

59 Yet crime also doubled during this period from a regional homicide rate of 13 to 26 per 100,000.


60 The costs obviously vary from country to country. In countries such as Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, the costs of prison administration are higher than the losses arising from incarceration. In other countries such as Brazil, Ecuador, Honduras, Paraguay, Peru and El Salvador, income losses are higher than spending on prisons.

There are comparatively few empirically robust evaluations of citizen security measures in Latin America. From sample of 304 interventions (23% of the total), only 20 (7%) were designated as ‘formal’ scientific impact evaluations.⁶¹ Impact evaluations of citizen security interventions were most commonly pursued in Colombia, Chile and Brazil. All but one of the evaluations identified a positive outcome. Another 67 interventions featured monitoring systems that ‘reported results’ in a standardized and convincing (21% of the sub-sample) manner. In these cases, the supporters of the intervention maintained documentation of outcomes (such as the number of beneficiaries, or some statement on results).

Section VI. Strategies

Although affected by high rates of criminal violence, there are a growing number of examples of Latin American countries, states and cities registering improvements. Many of these strategies were initiated at the municipal scale, demonstrating positive reductions in homicide, violent crime and victimization. Virtually all of these citizen security initiatives were accompanied with a clear set of over-arching objectives and targets, an integrated and inter-sector strategy, a strong data-collection capability, and clearly defined responsibilities across implementing partners.⁶²

Figure 5.3 Citizen security interventions in Latin America, by target threat (1998-2015, n: 1,100+)




Source: See Igarapé Institute, *Citizen Security Dashboard*.

61 By *formal* evaluations we mean evaluations employing a ‘scientific methodology’ using a counterfactual (e.g. experimental, quasi-experimental, and case study-based design). To be included, the findings of a given evaluation must detect a positive effect of the intervention in achieving the objective (cause–effect).

62 See Muggah and Szabó (2016). See also Cano and Rojido (2016).

Figure 5.4 Citizen security interventions in Latin America, by strategies (1998-2015, n: 1,100+)



Source: See Igarapé Institute, *Citizen Security Dashboard*.

Figure 6.1 Distribution of citizen security interventions in LAC (1998-2015, n: 1,100+)

Country	Rate	Country	Rate
Colombia	271	Peru	15
Regional	229	Venezuela	11
Brazil	202	Uruguay	9
Guatemala	100	Ecuador	9
Nicaragua	81	Bolivia	8
Honduras	69	Belize	6
El Salvador	65	Guyana	4
Trinidad and Tobago	31	Haiti	4
Mexico	29	Paraguay	3
Chile	29	Dominican Republic	2
Jamaica	24	The Bahamas	2
Argentina	22	Barbados	1
Panama	21	Saint Kitts and Nevis	1
Costa Rica	17	Puerto Rico	1

Source: Muggah and Szabó (2016).

Citizen security initiatives are often pursued at the regional, national, state and municipal levels. The most effective are aligned – bringing together a combination of financial and institutional resources from all levels. A review of citizen security programs in over 20 countries suggests that the majority – approximately 43% - are “national” level interventions. The next most common level of intervention are municipal interventions – accounting for roughly 27%. The remainder of interventions were pursued at the regional (18%) and state (12%) scale. This also reflects financing structures which tend to prefer national level bodies.

Figure 6.2 Levels of citizen security engagement (1998-2015, n: 1,100+)

	Interventions
City	347
National	537
Regional	229
State	152

Source: Muggah and Szabó (2016).

For example, Colombia’s ‘Plan Nacional de Vigilancia Comunitaria por Cuadrantes’ shows how focused police interventions, real-time crime monitoring, and prevention can help prevent and contain local crime. The program applied community-driven and problem-oriented policing approaches to strengthen neighborhood trust. Evaluations have shown that the strategy led to an 18% reduction in homicide, an 11% decline in personal assault and a 22% decline in car thefts.⁶³

Meanwhile, Rio de Janeiro’s Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP) also involved a combination of proximity policing and social interventions to curb homicidal violence. These strategies mobilized metrics focused on murder reduction, improvements in police training, and strategies to better outreach to poorly serviced communities. Between 2009 and 2014 the intervention is associated with reductions of homicide of between 50 and 78⁶⁴ What is more, police killings also declined precipitously, though have climbed back somewhat in recent years.⁶⁵

Another comprehensive intervention is “Todos Somos Juárez” which was initiated in 2010 to address violence in Ciudad Juárez. The program adopted a range of strategies, including community policing and targeted social prevention. It is considered to have significantly reduced homicide in the metropolitan area.⁶⁶ According to local government officials, homicides have been reduced by 70% since the program was launched.⁶⁷

63 See FIP (2012).


64 See Averbuck (2012) and Cano et al. (2012).

65 See Magaloni, Melo and Franco (2015).

66 See Cano and Rojido, (2016).

67 See Martínez (2013).

Figure 6.3 Homicide rates (per 100,000) in selected Latin American cities (1990-latest year)



Source: Homicide Monitor.

Notwithstanding the spread of citizen security innovations across Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico over the past decade, there is still persistent support for punitive and repressive approaches to fighting crime in Latin America. Many governments still pursue policies that favor mass incarceration, emphasizing the importance of lowering the age of criminal responsibility, building prisons and stiffening penalties. There also continues to be a disproportionate focus on penalizing drug-related crimes, including possession and consumption. This has resulted in sky-rocketing prison populations, including non-violent male and female offenders.

Even so, citizen security efforts have generated remarkable successes across Latin America.⁶⁸ Once notoriously violent cities such as Bogota, San Pedro Sula, Sao Paulo and Medellin have witnessed a 70-90% drop in murder over the past two decades.⁶⁹ While offering a glimpse of what is possible, these experiences are still rare. The challenges are monumental: half of the region's 300 largest cities feature homicide rates that are at least five times the global average. What is required is a comprehensive vision of citizen security that accounts for multiple levels of government and multi-sector interventions. These measures require reliable and high-quality data and analysis, developed in partnership with affected communities.

68 See Muggah and Szabó (2016) and Muggah et al. (2016).

69 See Muggah and Alvarado (2016).

What are the ingredients of success? While every situation is different, key ingredients include crafting a clear strategy with a determined focus on high-risk places, people and behaviors. A significant part of the solution requires addressing the specific risks— persistent inequality, youth unemployment, weak security and justice institutions, and organized crime groups fueled by drug trafficking. There are also several practices - including focused deterrence strategies, cognitive therapy for at risk youth, early childhood and parenting support and targeted efforts to reduce concentrated poverty – with a positive track record.⁷⁰

There are signs of a shift to more citizen security oriented approaches, but they need more support.⁷¹ Their usefulness needs to be demonstrated on both empirical and cost-effectiveness grounds. Robust impact evaluations are critical, as are opportunities for Latin American policy makers to share experiences. Innovative financing mechanisms are also urgently required if the funding gaps are to be bridged. A number of core principles for citizen security programming stand out.

Define a clear vision, set of priorities and targets. The most successful citizen security measures articulated a coherent vision, defined clear objectives, and set out targets and metrics to measure outcomes. Measuring and communicating results to the public is equally important so as to demonstrate a high degree of accountability and transparency. Ensuring sustained commitment to plans, programs and projects – and adjusting where necessary – is virtually always a key ingredient to achieving positive results.

Move beyond the law and order approach. Criminal justice – especially police, courts and prisons – are unable to deter and contain violent crime on their own. Indeed, there is growing evidence that the severity of sanctions has a weak deterrent effect on criminal offending. Longer sentences and harsher prison conditions also have unintended consequences, including increased recidivism. To reduce reoffending, it is essential that inmates receive more education and support in life-skills, self-discipline and job training.

Invest in preventive measures. Interventions that focus on primary, secondary and tertiary prevention can have both short- and medium- to longer-term impacts on reducing criminal violence. Programs that invest in quality job training, specific skills development, youth mentoring, rehabilitative therapy, school retention, preventing early teenage pregnancy, especially women’s empowerment are especially effective.

Emphasize specific types of employment opportunities for high-risk groups. Not all employment has the same “protective” benefits. The quality of employment for young male youth – especially jobs that are formal, offer opportunities for wage growth and advancement and intensive skills formation - is key. By way of contrast, early, transient and low-quality employment (e.g. low-skill and low-paying informal jobs) can actually be a risk factor. Put another way, early intensive attachment to the labor market can be counterproductive.

Experiment with alternatives to incarceration. There are signs that prisons can do more harm than good for offenders, especially young people. This is because of the costs in terms of lost education and productivity, but also because of criminogenic effects – the fact that young people tend to be more susceptible to organized crime networks in prisons. The decriminalization of low levels of drug possession and consumption together with proportionate and alternate sentencing procedures is critical. Likewise, electronic monitoring of convicts also appears to have a more positive effect than incarceration leading to a 50% drop in recidivism in Argentina, a massive saving to society.⁷²

⁷⁰ See Muggah et al. (2016).

⁷¹ See Ortega and Sanguinetti (2014).

⁷² See Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2013.

Focus resources on hot spots. Where there is social disorganization and opportunities for crime, it is likely to be more prolific. Owing to the way crime is hyper-concentrated, resources are best spent targeting specific high-risk places, people and behaviors. This in turn depends on having access to quality information on the distribution of criminal violence and underlying correlates. What is also exceedingly important is strengthening institutions to build positive relationships with affected neighborhoods.⁷³

Invest in focused deterrence and problem-oriented policing. The refocusing of policing assets on areas of high concentration of crime is widely associated with reductions in criminal violence. It is critical, however, that police are appropriately sized and that sanctions are enforced – the certainty of sanctions has a more robust deterrent effect than their severity. Likewise, policing strategies that privilege the identification, analysis, response to and evaluation of strategies to address crime are also to be supported. Activities that improve the likelihood of apprehension and reduce criminal activity are key.⁷⁴

Reinforce social cohesion and collective efficacy in communities. Because of the hyper-concentrated nature of crime and violence, it is important to build resilience in chronically affected areas. Strengthening community pride, social cohesion and neighborhood controls - including the relationships and norms shaping behavior – is critical.⁷⁵ This can be enhanced through specific changes in the built environment – CPTED – especially creating open/safe public spaces, high quality housing, and even street lights which can improve community pride and cohesion.

Enhance citizen participation in the selection, design, implementation and evaluation of interventions. Civil society – including social movements, neighborhood groups, scholars, the private sector and media – all have a central role to play in citizen security. Citizens must be consulted in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of interventions. Civic groups can reinforce government accountability and play a watch-dog function, support monitoring and surveillance of interventions, communicate campaigns and messages that emphasize anti-stigmatization, and strengthen skills of public sector counterparts.

Explore innovative financing mechanism. Given tightening austerity around the world, Latin American government and societies need to develop new tools and partnerships to finance citizen security. Cities will need to use greater discretion to issue debt, introduce taxes and establish strategic public-private partnerships. Social impact bonds – there are already 20 around the world targeting criminal justice reform, domestic violence prevention and recidivism reduction – will be key. There are already examples in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica and Mexico.⁷⁶

Invest in new technologies for public safety, but be sure to evaluate outcomes. The revolution in technology and processing is also precipitating a radical upgrade of law enforcement and prevention. Big data analytics – including COMPSTAT-style data monitoring systems, predictive policing, gunshot detection systems, together with body-worn cameras are changing how police work is conducted. There is a rapid spread of real-time crime monitoring platforms across the Americas as well as experimentation with new ways to improve police accountability. A major priority is evaluating them using robust methods to assess their overall impact and cost-effectiveness.

73 See Muggah et al (2017).

74 By contrast, rapid-response policing and broken window approaches are less effective.

75 See Chioda (2017).

76 See Social Finance, *Impact Bond Global Database*.

Annexes

Annex 1. Homicide rates per 100,000 per subregion and time period

Region	Subregion	2000-03	2004-07	2008-11	2012-15
Africa	Eastern Africa	7.33	5.71	4.03	6.71
	Middle Africa	-	2.5	3.03	5.91
	Northern Africa	1.7	1.17	0.93	1.83
	Southern Africa	27.07	22.31	24.91	27.26
	Western Africa	2.1	1.82	2.25	7.71
Asia	Central Asia	11.48	9.98	6.76	4.82
	Eastern Asia	1.78	3.83	2.41	2.09
	Eastern Asia & Pacific	5	4.18	3.53	3
	South-Eastern Asia	3.82	3.09	2.64	3.3
	Southern Asia	3.78	4.02	3.68	3.65
	Western Asia	3.1	4.25	3.97	2.93
Europe	Eastern Europe	4.44	3.88	3.6	2.91
	Northern Europe	3.33	3.21	2.66	2.22
	Southern Europe	1.59	1.41	1.74	1.56
	Western Europe	1.35	1.3	1.05	0.92
Oceania	Australia and New Zealand	1.62	1.34	1.19	1
	Eastern Asia & Pacific	8.27	8.85	9.53	-
	Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia	3.48	4.76	2.97	3.94
The Americas	Central America	17.16	24.84	35.07	32.72
	North America	8.64	6.2	7.17	4.08
	South America	21.48	19.37	16.76	16
	The Caribbean	11.79	15.33	20.23	20.41

Annex 2. Homicide rates. Countries of The Americas 2000-15

Subregion	Country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Central America	El Salvador						63.0	64.7	57.3	51.9	71.2	64.8	70.2	35.9	40.0	61.8	104.5	91.2
	Honduras					30.7	37.0	46.2	49.9	57.9	66.8	77.5	86.5	85.5	79.0	68.0	60.0	58.9
	Belize	19.7	26.1	34.6	25.9	29.8	29.8	33.0	33.9	35.4	32.6	41.8	39.2	44.7	29.8	36.2	33.0	39.0
	Guatemala	25.9	28.1	30.8	35.1	36.4	42.0	45.2	43.3	46.0	46.4	41.5	38.6	34.7	34.0	31.1	29.5	27.3
	Mexico	13.7	13.6	12.7	12.1	11.0	10.5	10.9	9.3	11.8	14.3	18.1	19.8	18.6	15.5	13.1	14.1	17.0
	Costa Rica											11.6	10.3	8.8	8.7	10.0	11.5	12.8
	Panamá	10.1	10.2	12.4	10.9	9.7	11.3	11.1	12.3	19.3	23.7	20.7	20.4	17.6	17.3	16.1	12.4	10.0
	Nicaragua						10.4	10.4	10.0	11.0	11.5	11.5	9.9	9.5	9.0	8.7	8.9	7.7
North America	Saint Pierre and Miquelon							0.0	0.0	16.5	16.5							
	United States of America	5.5	5.6	5.6	5.7	5.5	5.6	5.8	5.7	5.4	5.0	4.8	4.7	4.7	4.5	4.4	4.9	5.3
	Bermuda	0.0	4.8	1.6	3.1	1.6	3.1	4.7	4.7	7.7	9.3	10.8	12.3	7.7	4.8			
	Greenland	23.1	30.2	21.2	8.8	19.3	17.6	17.6	3.5	10.6	19.4	10.6	1.8					
	Canada	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.7
South America	Venezuela	32.9	32.0	38.0	44.0	37.0	37.3	45.1	47.6	51.9	48.9	45.0	47.8	53.7	53.0	62.0	58.1	58.0
	Brazil	26.2	27.3	27.9	28.3	26.5	25.7	26.2	25.2	26.2	26.6	26.7	26.4	28.3	28.3	29.4	27.5	
	Colombia	61.0	64.0	65.0	50.0	41.4	40.4	37.5	37.2	34.3	39.4	38.4	36.0	33.8	30.3	26.5	24.0	21.9
	Guyana	9.9	10.6	18.9	27.3	17.3	18.7	20.0	14.9	20.4	15.0	17.8	16.4	17.5	19.4			
	French Guiana					29.8	22.3	20.1	13.1	14.5	13.3							
	Paraguay	18.6	24.1	24.6	22.6	20.9	15.0	13.3	14.8	13.4	15.0	11.5	10.0	9.7	8.9	8.4	8.8	9.4
	Peru												5.4	6.5	6.6	6.7	7.2	7.7
	Uruguay	6.5	6.6	7.0	6.0	5.9	5.7	6.1	5.8	6.6	6.8	6.1	5.9	7.9	7.6	7.9	8.3	7.6
	Bolivia						7.1	6.4	8.3	8.8	8.5	8.6	8.5	10.4	8.4	8.8	6.4	6.4
	Argentina	5.8	7.0	7.6	7.4	5.9	5.3	5.0	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.4	5.2	8.8	7.6	6.6	6.0
	Suriname	4.1	3.8	2.7	5.8	5.1	5.6	4.6	4.7	4.5	5.6	5.3	5.9	5.2	5.2	5.7		
	Ecuador	16.6	15.5	15.8	13.3	17.1	17.5	16.8	16.1	17.1	14.8	17.5	15.4	12.4	10.9	8.2	6.4	5.7
	Chile						3.5	3.6	3.5	3.3	3.5	2.9	3.2	2.8	2.7	3.6	2.9	2.7
The Caribbean	United States Virgin Islands	22.1	25.8	37.8	28.5	34.2	32.5	40.0	40.1	42.1	46.9	52.6				39.4	42.5	304.6
	Trinidad and Tobago	9.5	11.9	13.4	17.8	20.1	29.8	28.5	32.1	41.6	38.3	35.7	26.4	28.3	30.3	30.0	62.7	
	Saint Kitts and Nevis	6.6	13.0	10.7	21.0	22.7	16.3	34.1	31.7	45.0	52.2	40.1	64.2	33.6			51.2	55.6
	Jamaica	34.2	43.7	39.9	37.0	55.5	62.9	50.5	59.5	60.6	62.8	53.8	42.0	40.6	44.0	36.9	44.3	50.7
	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	19.5	11.1	10.2	10.2	24.9	22.1	11.9	33.0	24.7	18.3	22.9	19.2	25.6	24.7	34.7		
	Bahamas	24.9	14.2	16.8	15.8	13.6	15.8	18.2	22.8	21.0	24.3	26.1	34.7	29.8	31.5	32.2	34.1	
	Anguilla	9.0	0.0	17.1	8.3	16.2	0.0	38.8	30.4	7.5	7.4	0.0	0.0	35.4	7.0	27.7		
	Puerto Rico	19.2	20.9	21.3	21.1	21.7	21.1	19.9	19.6	22.1	24.1	27.7	31.9	27.7	25.7	19.9	17.1	20.6
	Montserrat	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.9	20.6		20.4								
	Dominica	2.9	1.4	14.3	11.4	11.4	11.3	7.1	9.9	9.9	18.3	21.1	8.4	8.4	16.7			
	Saint Lucia							23.3	15.9	20.8	21.1	24.8	21.8	20.5	18.7	16.3		
	Dominican Republic	13.0	12.8	14.3	18.9	26.2	26.7	23.3	22.8	25.4	25.4	26.1	26.3	23.4	20.3	18.3	16.0	
	Cayman Islands	9.6	4.9	0.0	7.4	12.3		2.0	3.9	7.6	14.7							
	Antigua and Barbuda	5.2	7.6	6.2	6.2	11.0	3.6	14.4	20.1	16.4	18.5	8.0	10.2	10.1	14.4	14.3		
	Haiti					2.3	5.2	6.9	5.1	5.1	6.0	6.6	8.3	10.3	8.2	10.5	10.0	
	Barbados	7.5	9.3	10.0	11.5	8.5	10.6	13.1	10.1	10.1	6.8	10.3	10.7	7.8	8.8	8.8		
	British Virgin Islands	0.0	4.7	4.6	9.0	17.8		8.4										
	Guadeloupe					5.9	5.2	5.4	6.4	7.1	7.9							
	Grenada			13.7	7.8	6.8	8.7	10.7	10.6	18.3	6.7	11.5	9.5	16.1	5.7	7.5		
	Turks and Caicos Islands	0.0	0.0	11.3	0.0	0.0	0.0			6.8	6.6							
Cuba	5.2	5.4	5.9	5.7	5.9	6.1	5.1	5.1	4.6	5.0	4.5	4.8	5.5	6.0	5.4	5.4		
Aruba			5.3	4.1	2.0	12.0	9.9	5.9	4.9	3.9	3.9							
Martinique					4.8	4.8	5.8	5.8	4.3	2.7								

Source: Homicide Monitor

Annex 3. Homicide counts. Countries of The Americas 2000-15

Subregion	Country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Central America	Mexico	14,619	13,849	13,855	13,148	11,658	11,246	11,806	11,253	13,155	16,118	20,680	22,852	21,736	18,331	15,653	17,034	20,789
	El Salvador						3,812	3,928	3,497	3,179	4,382	4,004	4,366	2,246	2,513	3,912	6,656	5,280
	Honduras					2,155	2,417	3,018	3,262	4,473	5,265	6,239	7,104	7,172	6,757	5,936	5,148	5,150
	Guatemala	2,904	3,230	3,630	4,236	4,507	5,338	5,885	5,781	6,292	6,498	5,960	5,681	5,237	5,255	5,000	4,778	4,520
	Costa Rica											527	474	407	411	477	575	625
	Nicaragua						568	575	562	622	660	666	581	565	546	532	556	484
	Panamá	299	306	380	338	308	364	363	444	654	818	759	759	665	666	631	493	418
	Belize	47	64	87	67	79	81	92	97	104	98	129	124	145	99	123	119	138
North America	United States of America	15,586	16,037	16,229	16,528	16,148	16,740	17,309	17,128	16,465	15,399	14,722	14,661	14,856	14,319	14,164	15,883	17,250
	Canada	546	553	582	551	626	664	607	595	611	610	554	605	548	509	521	609	611
	Bermuda	0	3	1	2	1	2	3	3	5	6	7	8	5	3			
	Greenland	13	17	12	5	11	10	10	2	6	11	6	1					
	Saint Pierre and Miquelon							0	0	1	1							
South America	Brazil	45,360	47,943	49,695	51,043	48,374	47,578	49,145	47,707	50,113	51,434	52,260	52,198	56,337	56,804	59,681	56,212	
	Venezuela	8,022	7,960	9,617	11,342	9,719	9,964	12,257	13,156	14,589	13,985	13,080	14,098	16,072	16,073	19,030	17,778	18,230
	Colombia	25,681	27,685	28,534	22,199	17,554	17,329	16,270	16,318	15,250	17,717	17,459	16,554	15,733	14,294	12,626	11,585	10,677
	Argentina	2,150	2,601	2,862	2,792	2,248	2,037	1,959	1,795	1,834	1,833	1,868	1,808	2,152	3,352	3,227	2,837	2,605
	Peru												1,617	1,968	2,013	2,076	2,247	2,435
	Ecuador	2,086	1,986	2,059	1,771	2,315	2,409	2,357	2,301	2,479	2,187	2,624	2,344	1,922	1,725	1,309	1,048	941
	Bolivia						654	598	787	850	835	841	844	1,042	845	936	689	698
	Paraguay	995	1,314	1,372	1,285	1,209	887	798	906	833	953	741	657	649	604	578	617	669
	Chile						576	590	616	588	630	541	636	550	553	636	526	495
	Uruguay	214	218	231	197	194	188	203	194	221	226	205	199	267	260	262	293	265
	Guyana	74	79	142	206	131	142	153	115	158	117	140	130	139	155			
	Suriname	19	18	13	28	25	28	23	24	23	29	28	31	28	28	31		
	French Guiana					58	45	42	28	32	30							
The Caribbean	Dominican Republic	1,090	1,086	1,230	1,656	2,323	2,398	2,113	2,092	2,355	2,378	2,476	2,516	2,268	1,984	1,808	1,680	
	Jamaica	887	1,139	1,045	976	1,471	1,674	1,340	1,584	1,619	1,683	1,447	1,133	1,099	1,200	1,005	1,207	1,352
	Haiti					213	485	650	490	498	598	661	849	1,077	863	1,132	1,056	
	Trinidad and Tobago	120	151	171	229	260	386	371	421	547	507	474	352	379	407	403	868	
	Puerto Rico	734	802	820	818	843	825	783	774	874	956	1,030	1,180	1,015	924	707	614	704
	Cuba	587	605	661	642	660	684	576	568	515	565	505	534	621	674	600	609	
	Bahamas	74	43	52	50	44	52	61	78	73	86	94	127	111	119	123	126	
	United States Virgin Islands	24	28	41	31	37	35	43	43	45	50	56	-1			41	44	55
	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	21	12	11	11	27	24	13	36	27	20	25	21	28	27	38		
	Guadeloupe					26	23	24	29	32	36							
	Saint Kitts and Nevis	3	6	5	10	11	8	17	16	23	27	21	34	18			28	31
	Saint Lucia							39	27	36	37	44	39	37	34	30		
	Barbados	20	25	27	31	23	29	36	28	28	19	29	30	22	25	25		
	Antigua and Barbuda	4	6	5	5	9	3	12	17	14	16	7	9	9	13	13		
	Dominica	2	1	10	8	8	8	5	7	7	13	15	6	6	12			
	Martinique					19	19	23	23	17	11							
	Cayman Islands	4	2	0	3	6		1	2	4	8							
	Grenada			14	8	7	9	11	11	19	7	12	10	17	6	8		
	Anguilla	1	0	2	1	2	0	5	4	1	1	0	0	5	1	4		
	Aruba			5	4	2	12	10	6	5	4	4						
British Virgin Islands	0	1	1	2	4		2											
Turks and Caicos Islands	0	0	2	0	0	0			2	2								
Montserrat	0	0	0	0	0	1	1		1									

Source: Homicide Monitor

Annex 4. Rate (per 100,000) of reported criminal offences by country.

Country	Assault	Country	Kidnapping	Country	Theft	Country	Robbery	Country	Burglary
Grenada	1342.7	Canada	9.2	Uruguay	3096.1	Costa Rica	1095.6	Grenada	1396.3
St. Vin. and the Gren.	1017.1	Bahamas	7.5	Suriname	2778.8	Argentina	957.9	St. Vin and the Gren	1270.5
Guyana	854.2	Bermuda	6.4	St. Vin and the Gren	1923.5	Chile	598.7	Bermuda	1061.0
Bermuda	841.1	St. Kitts and Nevis	5.7	USA	1833.9	Mexico	588.9	St. Kitts and Nevis	847.2
Bahamas	841.1	St. Vin and the Gren	3.7	Canada	1374.5	Ecuador	570.6	Chile	687.2
Barbados	517.0	Peru	2.3	Grenada	1267.5	Uruguay	542.8	Barbados	552.3
Argentina	359.7	Global average	1.7	Chile	1082.1	Brazil	495.7	USA	541.5
Brazil	323.9	Mexico	1.5	St. Kitts and Nevis	926.5	Nicaragua	495.5	Suriname	446.1
Nicaragua	319.7	Chile	1.5	Brazil	873.8	Paraguay	307.1	Canada	425.9
Global average	291.6	Barbados	1.1	Puerto Rico	785.2	Global average	281.3	Costa Rica	368.9
St. Kitts and Nevis	258.5	Bolivia	1.0	Bermuda	774.2	Panama	268.1	Global average	362.4
USA	232.1	Belize	0.9	Global average	738.3	Peru	250.5	Belize	332.3
Peru	211.1	Jamaica	0.8	Argentina	703.8	Honduras	237.9	Puerto Rico	326.5
Jamaica	178.0	Honduras	0.6	Costa Rica	696.6	Guyana	201.2	Guyana	292.5
Costa Rica	174.7	Colombia	0.6	Barbados	690.9	Colombia	197.5	Uruguay	251.9
Colombia	172.1	Uruguay	0.6	Paraguay	581.3	Trinidad and Tobago	197.3	Trinidad and Tobago	191.4
Mexico	171.1	Panama	0.6	Panama	541.0	Dominican Republic	144.2	Mexico	160.8
Belize	165.3	Guatemala	0.3	Bahamas	533.0	Bolivia	140.7	Brazil	125.5
Canada	135.0	El Salvador	0.3	Guyana	380.8	Puerto Rico	140.3	Ecuador	105.2
Panama	111.3	Trinidad and Tobago	0.2	Peru	289.3	St. Vin and the Gren	136.3	Jamaica	90.5
Chile	98.2	Brazil	0.2	Colombia	286.4	Belize	135.8	Colombia	88.9
Bolivia	72.5	Ecuador	0.2	Belize	283.1	St. Kitts and Nevis	124.5	Bahamas	83.2
Puerto Rico	67.1	Dominican Republic	0.2	Dominican Republic	235.3	USA	102.0	Panama	61.9
El Salvador	64.2	Nicaragua	0.1	Nicaragua	182.2	Barbados	100.6	Dominican Republic	36.6
Dominican Republic	48.3	Costa Rica	0.1	Trinidad and Tobago	174.5	Bahamas	98.6	Peru	13.8
Ecuador	46.7			Ecuador	152.8	Jamaica	81.3	Guatemala	11.0
Trinidad and Tobago	41.2			El Salvador	123.3	El Salvador	77.5	El Salvador	9.4
Guatemala	37.3			Jamaica	75.4	Canada	58.8	Paraguay	7.4
Honduras	22.1			Mexico	72.9	Bermuda	51.0		
Uruguay	11.9			Guatemala	59.3	Grenada	22.6		
Paraguay	11.8			Honduras	57.7	Guatemala	19.4		
				Bolivia	50.8				

The number of reported crimes⁷⁷ across the world reflects a variety of phenomena associated with economic and personal crime. The report of crimes also depends on the institutional capacity of the law enforcement institutions of each country, the level of confidence on such organizations, and the level of impunity across others.

Country	Theft of Private Cars	Country	Motor Vehicle Theft	Country	Total Sexual Violence	Country	Rape	Country	Sexual Offences ag. Children
Bahamas	289.5	Bermuda	1140.6	St. Vin and the Gren	209.5	Suriname	45.6	St. Kitts and Nevis	295.3
USA	160.8	Uruguay	502.8	Costa Rica	154.7	USA	36.5	Costa Rica	222.0
Canada	134.4	Bahamas	357.7	St. Kitts and Nevis	120.8	Costa Rica	36.2	Jamaica	217.7
Uruguay	118.9	USA	215.8	Bermuda	111.5	St. Kitts and Nevis	35.9	St. Vin and the Gren	204.5
Global average	60.6	Canada	207.8	Jamaica	81.6	Guyana	35.3	Chile	173.7
Trinidad and Tobago	44.1	Chile	185.0	Bahamas	80.3	Bolivia	33.8	Bermuda	135.3
Bermuda	41.4	Argentina	153.6	Grenada	76.2	Nicaragua	31.9	Uruguay	133.9
Barbados	32.5	Mexico	153.4	Canada	73.6	Panama	28.7	Paraguay	112.0
Peru	21.6	Global average	127.2	Chile	70.8	Peru	28.5	Trinidad and Tobago	112.0
Paraguay	16.6	Puerto Rico	125.8	Trinidad and Tobago	67.1	Bahamas	25.8	Bahamas	110.7
El Salvador	15.7	Brazil	112.1	Paraguay	64.0	Jamaica	25.3	Bolivia	99.1
Colombia	14.0	Costa Rica	88.8	Nicaragua	63.2	Brazil	24.4	Global average	92.7
Dominican Republic	12.4	Ecuador	80.8	Panama	61.0	Barbados	19.1	El Salvador	85.5
Guatemala	6.4	Colombia	66.3	Global average	60.4	Global average	19.1	Honduras	66.9
		Guatemala	66.2	Barbados	57.9	St. Vin and the Gren	18.3	Canada	64.1
		Paraguay	62.7	Bolivia	47.1	Paraguay	18.1	Ecuador	63.8
		Peru	58.1	Uruguay	44.9	Grenada	16.9	Colombia	61.1
		Dominican Republic	57.5	El Salvador	41.9	Chile	16.1	Barbados	57.4
		Bolivia	54.8	Guyana	40.3	Colombia	14.7	Belize	51.9
		Trinidad and Tobago	54.8	Belize	36.8	Trinidad and Tobago	14.6	Peru	38.9
		St. Vin and the Gren	40.2	Honduras	33.2	Mexico	13.3	Nicaragua	38.8
		Barbados	32.5	Mexico	31.6	Honduras	13.2	Guyana	30.9
		Belize	27.9	Brazil	27.5	Bermuda	9.6	Grenada	14.6
		El Salvador	22.4	Colombia	26.5	Ecuador	9.1	Panama	6.6
		Jamaica	20.8	Argentina	26.3	Argentina	8.3	Mexico	5.2
		Honduras	17.7	Ecuador	19.0	Belize	8.2	Guatemala	5.2
		Guyana	10.1	Peru	18.1	Uruguay	7.7	Dominican Republic	3.8
		Suriname	8.2	Guatemala	4.3	El Salvador	6.0		
		Nicaragua	6.8	Dominican Republic	2.8	Guatemala	3.8		
		Panama	5.8	USA		Dominican Republic	2.8		
		St. Kitts and Nevis	5.7	Puerto Rico		Puerto Rico	1.5		
		Grenada	0.0	Suriname		Canada	1.4		

77 Data source: UNODC (2016). Homicide and other criminal offences (last updated on 07 May 2016). Downloaded on January 24 of 2017.

Annex 5. 25 Latin American and Caribbean cities with the highest homicide rates (per 100,000)

Country	State	City	Homicide rate latest year	Year
Honduras	Cortes	San Pedro Sula	189.55	2013
Bahamas	New Providence	Nassau	183.60	2011
Mexico	Veracruz De Ignacio De La Llave	Veracruz	178.46	2012
Mexico	Guerrero	Acapulco de Juárez	154.54	2012
Mexico	Tamaulipas	Nuevo Laredo	135.88	2012
Saint Kitts and Nevis	Saint George Basseterre	Basseterre	131.60	2011
Brazil	Pará	Ananindeua	125.67	2012
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	Distrito Capital	Caracas	122.00	2009
Mexico	Coahuila De Zaragoza	Torreón	118.87	2012
Belize	Cayo	Belmopan	92.90	2013
Brazil	Alagoas	Maceió	89.99	2012
Brazil	Espírito Santo	Serra	89.45	2012
Colombia	Valle Del Cauca	Santiago de Cali	85.74	2013
Brazil	Bahia	Camaçari	81.88	2012
Anguilla	Anguilla	The Valley	81.27	2013
Honduras	Cortes	Choloma	80.07	2013
Brazil	Ceará	Fortaleza	76.79	2012
Brazil	Paraíba	João Pessoa	76.50	2012
Brazil	Espírito Santo	Cariacica	72.64	2012
Honduras	Francisco Morazan	Distrito Central	72.11	2014
Brazil	Bahia	Vitória da Conquista	69.33	2012
Guatemala	Guatemala	Guatemala	68.64	2013
El Salvador	San Salvador	San Salvador	68.02	2013
Brazil	Paraná	Foz do Iguaçu	67.26	2012
Mexico	Chihuahua	Chihuahua	66.99	2012

Annex 6. 25 cities with lowest rates of criminal violence (2005-2016 or latest year)

City	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Las Condes (comuna in Chile)	0.4	0.0	0.7	1.1	1.1	0.3	0.0	2.8	0.3	0.3	1.4	0.3
Maipu (comuna in Chile)	0.3	1.5	1.9	0.8	1.4	0.7	1.3	1.1	1.2	0.9	1.4	0.4
Puente Alto (comuna in Chile)	4.1	3.5	3.5	4.0	2.6	2.8	2.0	2.0	1.4	3.0	2.2	1.1
La Paz (city in Bolivia)											5.3	1.5
La Florida (comuna in Chile)	2.5	3.3	2.8	1.5	5.0	2.8	2.8	1.3	2.8	3.0	3.0	2.3
Temuco (comuna in Chile)	1.1	2.5	3.5	2.7	2.3	2.0	2.3	1.6	0.9	1.2	0.9	2.4
Ambato (city in Ecuador)						4.4	8.4	7.4	5.9	2.2	0.5	2.4
Viña del Mar (comuna in Chile)	1.0	1.4	2.7	2.4	1.4	1.7	1.7	2.1	2.4	3.1	2.4	2.4
Mérida (city in Mexico)							3.9	2.0	2.5	2.1	2.3	2.8
Aguascalientes (city in Mexico)							7.1	4.0	2.3	3.6	3.1	3.0
Antofagasta (comuna in Chile)	2.1	0.9	1.4	2.3	3.3	4.4	2.4	1.6	0.5	1.8	4.3	3.2
Bahía Blanca (departamento judicial in Argentina)					4.3	2.7	3.1	3.5	3.1	3.5	3.4	
Corrientes (city in Argentina)									3.4			
Portoviejo (city of Ecuador)						14.5	19.7	10.8	9.6	3.6	3.6	3.5
Cuenca (city in Ecuador)						5.7	4.7	5.7	4.1	4.6	2.6	3.5
San Bernardo (comuna in Chile)	5.3	6.3	5.8	2.4	3.3	3.3	4.8	4.4	7.5	4.0	6.7	3.6
Saltillo (city in Mexico)							11.7	13.5	9.9	5.9	5.0	3.6
Junin (departamento judicial in Argentina)								3.8	6.0	5.6	3.7	
Iquitos (city in Peru)							0.2	2.1	0.2	4.0		
Buenos Aires -CABA (city in Argentina)				4.7		5.8	6.6	5.5	6.1	6.6	5.4	4.1
Quito (city in Ecuador)						11.9	9.4	9.0	7.8	5.7	4.7	4.1
Tampico (city in Mexico)							16.1	18.4	6.5	20.8	9.1	4.2
Puebla (city in Mexico)							9.0	7.9	4.1	3.1	4.8	4.4
Cochabamba (city in Bolivia)											2.8	4.4
Dolores (departamento judicial in Argentina)					6.3	4.9	3.8	4.9	6.6	5.6	4.6	

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